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Peron and the Unions* 
Te acordas, hermana, que tiempos aquellos ... 
la vida nos daba la misma leccion. 
Te acordas de la Plaza de Mayo 
cuando el que te dije salia al balcon ...1 
Vos que tenes labia, contame una historia. 
Metele con todo, no te hagas rogar. 
Mentime al oido la fabula dulce 
de un mundo querido, sonadoy mejor.2 
The relationship between Peron and the working class movement in the crucial early 
years 1945 and 1946 has given much work to the presses and polemics to sociologists. 
Now that the movement is undergoing, if not a final decline, at least a deep transfor-
mation, I wish to add some more elements to the debate, taking advantage of the 
hindsight afforded by time, and illustrating, without necessarily intending it, Hegel's 
dictum that the bird of Minerva takes flight at dusk. 
There is no doubt that Peron gained the support of the majority of the working 
class, even if its intensity and breadth can be discussed. But up to what point did he 
attain the involvement of the existing trade union leadership? Some initial studies, 
mostly by Gino Germani, which emphasised the role of internal migrants in the 
genesis of the movement, took for granted that the greater part of the pre-existing 
leadership did not join the bandwagon, and that they were short-circuited by the new 
idol of the masses. Other studies, which I will call 'revisionist', claimed that the role 
of the working class was quite autonomous in the process, on the basis of pragmatic 
considerations, also among its more experienced cadres, which would have decided 
to opt for a new alliance, over and above the ideological concerns of an earlier gen-
eration. The well-known works of Miguel Murmis, Juan Carlos Portantiero and Juan 
Carlos Torre have stressed this point, creating what in practice has become a new 
orthodoxy. Typical of the 'revisionist' literature is Murmis and Portantiero's state-
ment that 'the new elite offering a populist project finds an already organised working 
class, also possessing a social project, and offers it an alliance'. Therefore, 'there 
would not have been ... a dissolution of workers' autonomy in favour of heteronomy 
in the initial stage of Peronism, but, if at all, such a thing would have happened at a 
later point'.3 Torre summarises his position saying, in a recent work, that 'at a crucial 
I would like to thank the Institute of Latin American Studies of the University of London for the 
opportunity to spend a month there in the early part of 2001, taking advantage of its stimulating 
intellectual atmosphere to put some order in my ideas and data, and to prepare this first version of a 
larger study I have been preparing for quite some time. 
1 'El cuarenta y cinco,' by Maria Elena Walsh (1967), in Jose Gobello, Letras de tangos: selection, 1897-
1981 (Buenos Aires, 1997), p. 290. 
2 'Contame una historia,' by Alfredo Mario Iaquinandi and Eladia Blazquez (1966), in Gobello, 
Selection, p. 286. 
3 Miguel Murmis and Juan Carlos Portantiero, Estudios sobre los origenes del peronismo (Buenos Aires, 
moment in the Argentine working class's relationship with Peron [17 October 1945], 
the initiative very much lay with the trade union movement; Peron was more its 
creature than the labour movement his.'4 
I must say from the outset that I believe this new orthodoxy to be wrong, and that 
it underestimates the requirements of what may be called an autonomous working 
class organisation. Admittedly, it is quite complex to determine what exacdy consti-
tutes an 'autonomous organisation' of the working class, and it is necessary to explore 
further this concept. In these pages, part of a larger work in preparation, I try to do 
this, on the basis of a prosopography accumulated through several years of research.5 
The subject, of course, is highly vulnerable to ideological distortion. Germani's 
approach, emphasising the scarcely autonomous character of Peron's popular sup-
port, implied a criticism, quite evident beneath the cloak of scientific objectivity. This 
became unfashionable during the 1960s, when intellectual circles started looking up 
to Peronism as the possible harbinger of a revolutionary way out from Argentina's 
muddle. Thus new interpretations were explored, seeking to listen to the voices 'from 
below'. This is paradoxical, because if there ever was a movement with a high com-
ponent 'from above', it was Peronism. 
Anti-status-quo elites and masses: a model to build 
For an adequate comprehension of a populist phenomenon such as Peronism it is 
necessary to take into account two factors: namely, what happens at the level of the 
elites, and what goes on in the wider scenario of the popular classes. When refer-
ring to elites, I have in mind groups of a certain size, that is, something more than a 
couple of individuals, 'charismatic' or otherwise, plus their friends and hangers-on. 
Elites, in the sociological meaning of the term, do not coincide with a given social class 
or fragment of a class defined in occupational or economic terms. But often it is 
possible to specify the spaces in the social pyramid which, due to the tensions they 
are subjected to, are more likely to become preferential recruiting grounds for those 
elites. 
An example of the alternative ways this issue can be treated is a recent book by 
James Brennan, who charges me with the assertion that an anti-status quo elite made 
1971), pp. 112 and 123. Germani's first statement of his interpretation was published as a conference 
paper at the Instituto Libre de Estudios Superiores, in 1956, and reproduced in Politicay sociedad en una 
epoca de transition (Buenos Aires, 1962). The 'revisionist' bibliography includes Hugo del Campo, 
Sindicalismo y peronismo: los comienzos de un vinculo perdurable (Buenos Aires, 1983); Joel Horowitz, Argentine 
Unions, the State and the Rise of Peron, 1930-1945 (Berkeley, 1990); David Tamarin, The Argentine Labor 
Movement, 1930-1945: A Study in the Origins of Peronism (Albuquerque, 1985); Juan Carlos Torre, La vieja 
guardia sindical y Peron (Buenos Aires, 1990). There is a restatement of Germani's theories in his 'El 
surgimiento del peronismo: el rol de los obreros y los migrantes internos,' Desarrollo Economico, vol. 13, 
no. 51 (Oct.-Dec. 1973), pp. 435-88, and a debate with articles by Peter Smith, Eldon Kenworthy, 
Tulio Halperin Donghi and Peter Ranis in Desarrollo Economico, nos. 51, 54, 56 and 57 (from Oct.—Dec. 
1973 to April-June 1975). 
4 Juan Carlos Torre, 'The Ambivalent Giant,' in James Brennan (ed.), Peronism and Argentina 
(Wilmington, DE, 1998), pp. 125-37, in p. 128. 
5 This prosopography, with over 3,000 persons, has been prepared with the collaboration of Maria 
del Carmen Arnaiz, Patricia Chomnalez and Laura Kalmanowiecki. It is based on union periodicals 
and interviews from the Programa de Historia Oral of the Instituto Di Telia (PHO-ITDT) and of the 
Fundacion Simon Rodriguez (PHO-FSR). 
up of new industrialists was a central factor in the support of the 1943 coup and its 
aftermath. Immediately he adds that later studies or analyses by various authors show 
that such a support was non-existent, or very weak, or even the opposite, that is, an 
opposition. Anyway, Brennan continues by describing in a very interesting way the 
connections between the industrialists and the Peronist government (not the mass 
movement), and concludes, in a somewhat contradictory fashion, that the thesis 
about the role of the industrialists in the genesis of Peronism 'though it was greatly 
overblown, should not be dismissed as completely mistaken5.6 
As I see it, the world of ideas and apprehensions prevalent among industrialists 
(and other groups) during the first years of the Second World War contributed to the 
formation of the Peronist elite. This does not mean that a majority of the industrialists 
were behind the 1943 army coup, but rather that through their attitudes they con-
tributed to the formation of a social group or elite which came to power, and from 
which Peron emerged. For this to happen, of course, it was necessary that a number 
of those industrialists should have been involved, directly or indirectly, in the process. 
What proportion of them is necessary for the phenomenon to be said to have existed, 
is difficult to say. But it must be more than an idiosyncratic attitude of a very few 
people. Thus, it is unlikely that a Friedrich Engels could be understood as represent-
ing a subsector of the British industrialists of his day. By contrast, a Miguel Miranda 
or a Rodolfo Lagomarsino can be identified in such a manner, even if they did not 
have the support of the majority of their class, which was submitted to, and split by, 
contradictory forces. 
This argument is, of course, more complex than a simple counting of heads. And 
it is admittedly ambiguous to speak of 'indirect' linkages, but unfortunately simplicity 
and rock-solid evidence are not a trait of social or historical phenomena. What is 
necessary is to determine in greater detail the attitudes, the contacts, the strategies, or 
even the silent complicities of many of these entrepreneurs, for whom, in any case, 
initial sympathies for what promised to be a protectionist industrialising policy were 
increasingly affected by the mobilising discourse of the ascending colonel, who came 
to be seen as stimulating industrial unrest and a contempt for the laws of a 
wholesome economy. 
An analysis of the social conditions that make it possible for an elite to emerge is 
also necessary in order to understand other contexts which facilitated Peron's ascent. 
Another central factor was the existence of a very numerous group of middle-ranking 
military officers, full of nationalist ideas contrary to the status quo then reigning in 
Argentina. If Peron came to prominence it was not a simple effect of his personality, 
but rather of the existence of the G O U (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos, or Grupo Obra 
de Unification), which in turn must be explained as due to certain social tensions 
6 James Brennan, 'Industrialists and 'Bolicheros',' in his edited book Peronism and Argentina, pp. 79-
123, in pp. 81-82 and 84; Dardo Cuneo, Comportamientoy crisis de la close empresarial (Buenos Aires, 1967), 
pp. 174-5; Eldon Kenworthy, 'Did the New Industrialists Play a Significant Role in the Formation of 
Peron's Coalition, 1943-1946?,' in Alberto Ciria (ed.), New Perspectives on Modern Argentina (Bloomington, 
1972); Joel Horowitz, 'Industrialists and the Rise of Peron: Some Implications for the Conceptualization 
of Populism,' Americas, vol. 47, no. 2 (Oct. 1990), pp. 199-217; Scott Mainwaring, 'The State and the 
Industrial Bourgeoisie in Peron's Argentina, 1945-1955,' Studies in Comparative International Development, 
vol. 21, no. 3 (Fall 1986), pp. 3-31. For a contrastng opinion see Judith Teichman, 'Interest Conflict and 
Entrepreneurial Support for Peron,' Latin American Research Review, vol. 16, no. 1 (1981), pp. 144-55. 
operating at the level of their profession. In many countries of the Third World or of 
the periphery those tensions do exist, and have spawned such phenomena as 
Brazilian tenentismo during the 1920s, or Bolivia's so-called 'military socialism' the 
following decade, not to speak of 'national' socialism in Japan at about that time, or 
of the more recent 'Arab socialism' from Gamal Abdel Nasser to the Baath Party, 
and the Peruvian Revolution (1968-75). 
In regions of more advanced economic and cultural development, like Western 
Europe or the United States, those things rarely if ever happen, nor are they found in 
Uruguay, or only very occasionally, and for a brief period in Chile. In the latter 
country the political movement led by Arturo Alessandri — head of a section of the 
Liberal Party — has been compared to that of Hipolito Yrigoyen, but it was far from 
having acquired similar mobilisational traits, and the same can be said when one 
compares Carlos Ibanez with Peron. Ibanez tried to rule in an authoritarian and 
populist manner from 1927 to 1931, but he failed miserably, and when returned to 
power democratically in 1952 it was with the participation of a Trojan horse, the 
Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) and its associated activists and trade unionists. When 
both allies fell out after a couple of years, the PSP went into opposition and retained 
its following, leaving the general isolated in the Moneda. In other words, they did 
what the Argentine Partido Laborista could not or did not wish to do when Peron 
decreed their dissolution, except for a small minority led by Cipriano Reyes. In 
Uruguay batllismo, a reformist variant of the Partido Colorado, was progressive and 
popular, but scarcely mobilisational, and never possessed significant trade union cad-
res, but negotiated with the existing ones, enrolled in factions of the Left, as in 
Argentina and Chile.7 
In Argentina before the Second World War there had also been a scarcity of mo-
bilisational experiences, except in their limited yrigoyenista version, which, like batllismo, 
did not have its own union structures but had to negotiate with the existing ones who 
kept their independence. Nor was there an equivalent of Brazilian tenentismo during 
the 1920s and '30s. If at all, something similar (but among higher officer ranks) 
happened during the 1940s. 
Social tensions operating at the level of the men on horseback during the early 
1940s were, in turn, close to those affecting the right wing nationalist intelligentsia, 
some sectors of the Church and industrial entrepreneurs seeking an expanded 
production, for civilian or military purposes. Gino Germani was not too concerned with 
an analysis of the class factors that could have determined the formation of the Peronist 
elite (as Karl Marx had also disregarded Bonapartism). His attention was centred on 
the forms of aggregation of the popular classes, their rural or urban origins, their degree 
of social mobilisation, that is, the degree of rupture with traditional forms of social 
deference. He took as a central explanatory variable the disparity between high social 
mobilisation — a concept I shall return to — and a lack of experience of autonomous 
organisation among the newcomers to the urban labour force. His perspective was that 
of the analysis of class structure, with all the necessary subdivisions, while ideologies, 
though significant, were mostly a dependent variable. 
7 Rene Millar Carvacho, La election presidential de 1920 (Santiago, 1981); Jorge Rojas Flores, La 
dictadura de Ibanez. y los sindicatos, 1927-1931 (Santiago, 1993); Cristian Garay Vera, El Partido Agrario 
Ijaborista (Santiago, 1990). 
It is strange that Marxist scholars such as Ernesto Laclau have based their criti-
cism of Germani's model on the fact that he did not take sufficiendy into account the 
independence of some 'superstructural' variables. According to Laclau, a populist 
movement is generated by a social actor (supposedly, from the higher reaches of 
society) who interpellates a popular mass, 'constituting' it through that interpellation 
using a given discourse.8 It is difficult to imagine a more passive ('heteronomous') role 
for the working class, conscious or not, new or old, rural or urban, an sich or Jiir sich. If 
I act in a given way, it is not because someone interpellates me and therefore defines 
or constitutes me. Who is that person, so omnipotent as to define me, constitute me, 
or whatever, without my taking part in the process? Admittedly, I may be more or 
less easily influenced, but that will not be because someone constitutes me in such a 
manner, but because there is something in me that allows it to happen. In given cir-
cumstances there will be more people intent on interpellating or defining me, but 
their success will depend on my predisposition, my availability, so to say. And the 
same is true for a social group. 
It may be true that the populist phenomenon is possible only when the dominant 
ideological discourse undergoes a crisis, as Laclau claims and Marx earlier hinted. 
But it is necessary to explore what factors make an elite drawn from the propertied 
classes adopt and use a new 'discourse', and why ample sectors of the people accept 
that discourse. That acceptance is not automatic, or a simple consequence of an 
omnipotent appellation. That is, in no way are those popular sectors 'constituted' by 
a 'discourse'. They have their own traditions, their own ideas and political 
experiences, a greater or lesser tendency to accept external leadership, and it is there 
that the study should be centred. If, to go on using the jargon, the interpellation is an 
important part of the formation of a populist coalition, it is not the cause constituting 
the popular actor. 
For Germani — and in this I follow his line of reasoning — the organisationally 
less experienced sectors of the working class, with a lesser participation in civil society, 
tend to follow more easily the kind of leadership that may be called mobilisational 
caudillismo. To use the terminology of Laclau, they allow themselves more easily to be 
constituted by external appellations, but even in this case the emphasis should be put 
on them, not on the interpellation they receive. In other contexts, more seasoned 
working-class groups may also enter into multi-class coalitions, but of their own 
accord and not because anybody constitutes them. In this game of coalition-building 
some actors have more weight than others, more autonomy and clarity of purposes. 
8 'What constitutes the unifying principle of an ideological discourse is the "subject" interpellated and 
thus constituted through this discourse.' Further on he adds that, according to Althusser, 'ideology 
"acts" or "functions" in such a way that it "recruits" subjects among the individuals ... or transforms the 
individuals into subjects ... by the very precise operation that I have called interpellation or hailing,' and 
which can be imagined along the lines of the most common everyday police (or other) hailing: 'Hey, you 
there'. Interpellations can be subdivided into either class-oriented or popular-democratic, the latter 
being the basis of populism. Ernesto Laclau, 'Towards a Theory of Populism,' in his Politics and Ideology in 
Marxist Theory: Capitalism-Fascism-Populism (London, 1977), pp. 100-1. Mariano Plotkin comments, in 
'The Changing Perceptions of Peronism: A Review Essay,' in James Brennan (ed.), Peronism and Argentina, 
pp. 29-54: 'In his seminal essay ... Laclau moves the discussion to a new dimension: ideology. He 
disagrees that a class-based analysis of a movement is the key to the understanding of it ... Following 
Althusser, Laclau points out that "what constitutes the unifying principle of an ideological discourse is 
the subject interpellated, and thus constituted, through this discourse'" (p. 40). 
To understand this scenario it is necessary to study the cultural differences between 
various social strata, their internal differentiation, and above all the way they form 
their own elites, that is, a leadership cadre emerging from their own ranks and re-
maining close to them. And it is necessary to explore the alternative strategies of the 
leaders of the popular classes regarding alliances with other social groups, for exam-
ple, between intellectuals of the left or the right, the lower middle classes, the military, 
priests, business people big or small, or whatever. 
Inevitably, there will be differences within the popular classes, and some of them 
will follow an external leadership. Which of them and why is the subject of the pres-
ent analysis. Until the advent of Peronism the working class was organised on the 
basis of its own efforts, in alliance with lower middle class and intellectual groups, as 
in Europe, Australia, the United States, Chile and Uruguay. It had never benefited 
from direct organisational support from the state, in contrast to post-revolutionary 
Mexico, or the Brazil of Getulio Vargas. Since the end of the nineteenth century, due 
to libertarian and syndicalist influence, it largely rejected even negotiations with gov-
ernment officials. The socialists themselves, though they didn't share that rejection, 
were limited by the criticism of their rivals. Hipolito Yrigoyen, after his election in 
1916, initiated a more favourable policy, notably with his intervention in the railway 
conflict of 1917. This attitude stimulated a symmetrical change on the other side, 
even among syndicalists, whose pragmatic wing, represented by the Union 
Ferroviaria's Antonio Tramonti, was strengthened. Despite later events like the 
Semana Tragica, the railwaymen's union saluted 'the first popular government of the 
republic', which had appointed a minister of public works (Pablo Torello) without 
consulting the companies.9 
Sometimes, even the intervention of police chiefs was sought, a practice familiar 
since the beginning of the century. This involvement of the police may seem some-
what surprising, given its role in repressing the common, and often widespread, 
labour conflicts. However, maybe because of that very fact, it was important to seek 
their impartiality using the contacts that must have existed between the intermediate 
levels of both institutions, often people of the same modest social extraction. 
However, despite occasionally favourable attitudes, neither the radicals nor the 
conservatives could boast a loyal cadre of supporters among union leaders, though 
many among the rank and file who could vote, having been born in the country, 
opted for the radicals. In some recent studies it has been claimed that many syndi-
calist leaders in fact acted as though they were part of the radical government 
machine, but this distorts and exaggerates the facts.10 Although the proximity of the 
Confederation General del Trabajo (CGT) to the ruling circles of the 'decada 
infame' has been pointed out, a fact that may help correct some views as to the na-
ture of those ruling circles, this far from reflects an organic connection between trade 
unionism and officialdom. In fact, it would have been very strange if such clearly con-
servative governments or political parties as those oriented by Alberto Barcelo or 
Manuel Fresco, however 'socially oriented' they might have been, had been able to 
nurture their own labour cadres. The negotiations, visits and protocolic occasions, 
9 El Obrero Ferroviario, 1 June 1919. 
10 Felix Luna, Consewadoresy peronistas (Buenos Aires, 1997), and his Ahear (Buenos Aires, 1986). 
already very common in those days, are a different matter, which should not be con-
fused with a common participation in a political movement. 
But which was the working class whose organisation was going to confront the tran-
scendental challenge from the dynamic Secretary of Labour after 1943? Obviously 
there must have been some heterogeneity within it, the problem is how much, and with 
what consequences in generating different attitudes. My hypothesis is that the degree of 
heterogeneity was quite high, and a cause of contrasting behaviours. Of course the lim-
its were not sharply defined, and besides, such a complex movement as Peronism could 
never have been based on just one of those sectors. 
The heterogeneity of the Argentine working class: myths and 
theories 
It is quite widely accepted in the literature that dependent industrial development 
tends to 'create "heterogeneous" or "fragmented" popular classes' which demand 
support from the state, and this is aggravated under populism.11 It is equally signifi-
cant that some of the 'revisionist' researchers who deny the importance of working 
class heterogeneity in the formation of Peronism use that criterion to understand 
more recent phenomena, such as the leftist and confrontational unionism dominant 
in the Cordoba of the 1960s and '70s. Thus, Juan Carlos Torre asserts that those 
attitudes were 'especially strong in the recently industrialised centres of the Interior 
and among the "new working class".' Further on he refers to the 'ever-widening sec-
toral and regional disparities within the working class and the labour movement, 
leadership and rank and file alike', due to the liberalisation and restructuring policies 
of the previous 20 years. And in a flashback he goes back to the end of the Second 
World War, when the working class: 
was growing enormously as waves of migrants from the interior of the country 
poured into the principal cities, especially Buenos Aires. The spectacle of the 
conglomeration of vast numbers of workers in old and new neighbourhoods and 
the growing strength of more radical unions, especially the Communists, 
disconcerted many Argentines — but none more so than the military. 
He adds that 'among the reasons for the 1943 coup d'etat was the fear permeating 
important sectors of the military about social catastrophe if this growing sector of 
the population were not controlled'.12 Here an important issue emerges, which has 
stimulated opposing opinions among researchers of the period. There are some 
who share the perception, dominant among upper class circles, that such an influx 
is usually 'dangerous'. I must admit, even though I may be in bad company, that I 
am also of that school of thought. Others, by contrast, believe that the recently 
arrived cohorts, due to their low ideological involvement, cannot form the basis of 
11 Joe Foweraker, Theorizing Social Movements (London, 1995), p.32, who refers to Jose Alvaro Moises et 
al., Contradi$oes urbanas e movimentos sociais (Rio de Janeiro, 1977), and to Fernando Calderon and 
Elizabeth Jelin, Closes y movimientos sociales en America Latina (Buenos Aires, 1987). 
12 See his 'The Ambivalent Giant,' pp. 132, 134 and 127. I have called this 'the Great Fear of 1942-
1943' in Sociologia de los procesos politicos (Buenos Aires, 1985), pp. 291-8, and I have restated it, to seek 
convergences with Carlos Waisman's alternative interpretation in his Reversal of Development in Argentina: 
Post-war Counterrevolutionary Policies and their Structural Consequences (Princeton, 1987), in my article, 'The 
Transformations of Peronism,' in James Brennan (ed.), Peronism and Argentina, pp. 204-6. 
a leftist alternative, but rather follow clientelistic networks posing no challenge to 
the existing order.13 
But the alternative is not between some form of radicalism and a conservative 
clientelism. Between those two poles there is ample place for populist outcomes, 
often not taken much into account by researchers fascinated (or concerned) with 
the revolutionary option. The 'danger' is not due to the newcomers' determination 
to subvert the social order: that is practically never the case. But they do come 
ready for anything, and that is the problem. Being easily integrated into mobilisa-
tional movements, they become the support for leaders who may at a certain 
moment adopt highly confrontational attitudes towards the establishment. Latin 
American history has repeatedly illustrated this possibility, due to the malleable 
characteristics of the social bases of populism, not despite them. Admittedly, popu-
lism does not fulfil the canonical requirements for a social revolution, but it may 
approach them malgre soi. It is, therefore, menacing, even if not always revolution-
ary in a strict interpretation of that term.14 
Going back now to the heterogeneity of the working class, it is necessary to avoid 
simplistic statements of the issue, even if many were assumed by the participants, and 
even by some academics, or mutually hurled at each other. It is necessary then to 
make a brief reference to the more vulnerable ones, to get them out of the way. One 
of them is that Peronism was a pathological phenomenon in Argentine politics, in 
contrast with other saner alternatives. This language reeks too much of the barricade, 
or of a Barrio Norte tea party to take it seriously even if James Brennan assigns it to a 
whole series of theories, among them the belief that Peronism is a form of 
Bonapartism. I do not see why the seminal analyses of Karl Marx should be thus de-
valued. The fact that these analyses have been distorted by disciples and sects does 
not permit one to discard them, or to refrain from applying them to other scenarios. 
In any case, valid or not, they do not imply that the process under analysis is 
13 Of this school of thought are works by Wayne Cornelius, 'The Cityward Movement: Some Political 
Implications,' in Douglas Chalmers (ed.), Changing Latin America (New York, 1972), pp. 27-41, and his 
'Political Sociology of Cityward Migration in I^atin America: Towards Empirical Theory,' in R. Rabinovitz 
and F. Trueblood (eds.), Latin American Urban Research (California, 1971), as well as his book Politics and the 
Migrant Poor in Mexico City (Stanford, 1975). This author, not finding any clear association between the 
structural traits of migrants and their political attitudes, concludes that 'the main determinant of the 
frequency of political participation is a general disposition to work collectively with others', which seems to 
me almost tautological, as does his other statement that the second predictor of participatory frequency is 
'to be a member of a politically relevant organization' ('The Cityward Movement', p. 35 and footnote 15). 
See also Alejandro Portes, 'Urbanization and Politics in Latin America,' Social Science Quarterly, vol. 52 (Dec. 
1971), and his 'Political Primitivism, Differential Socialization, and Lower-Class Leftist Radicalism,' 
American Sociological Review, vol. 36 (Oct. 1971), pp. 820-35. From a different ideological perspective Samuel 
Huntington and Joan Nelson concur that migrants usually become involved in clientelistic networks, in No 
Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries (Cambridge, MA, 1976), and in Joan Nelson, Access to 
Power: Politics and the Urban Poor in Developing Nations (Princeton, 1979), even if they believe that migrants can 
become the basis of destabilisation, due to an excessive increase in participation. Polemically against this 
conclusion, see Adam Przeworski, 'Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or Is Mobilization the Source of 
Decay?,' American Political Science Review, vol. 69 (1975), pp. 49—67. 
14 For other data about the political involvement of inhabitants of the barriadas, see Bryan Roberts, Organizing 
Strangers: Poor Families in Guatemala City (Austin, 1973), and his Cities of Peasants: The Political Economy of Urbanization 
in the Third World (Beverly Hills, 1979); Teofilo Altamirano, Presencia andina en Lima MetropoliUma: estudio sobre 
migrantesy clubes de provincianos (Lima, 1984); Henry A. Dietz, 'Political Participation in the Barriadas: An 
Extension and Reexamination,' Comparative Political Studies, vol. 18, no. 3 (October 1985), pp. 323-55. 
'pathological'.15 True enough, some of the more rabid opponents of Peronism have 
used this phraseology, taking it from the studies of the social or psychological pathol-
ogy which generated Nazism. But even in the German experience, the word 
'pathological' is more than anything a metaphor denoting hostility, which does not 
contribute to an understanding of the historical experience. 
Another stream charges the supporters of Peron with irrationality, while others 
would follow more closely the dictates of reason. This approach, also taken from 
the early theories about mass society, does not withstand greater scrutiny. It is un-
just to charge anybody with this defect, when a whole body of studies in the 
Freudian tradition put all of us in the same bag, while more recent theories believe 
we all act as computers calculating gains and losses. The concept of rationality of 
action is very elusive, despite the fact that such luminaries as Max Weber gave it 
pride of place in their studies. 
Germani at times used the concept of irrationality to refer to the adherents to 
Peronism. In his first essay on the subject, published in 1956, he dealt with the issue 
of rationality as a guide in everyday life, extending it to a wider sphere, stating that 
modernisation implies that 'a greater number of people have ceased believing in tra-
ditional norms, but, at the same time, have not become trained to accept, consciously 
and rationally, what they used to believe without reflection nor discussion, as a tradi-
tional and revealed truth'. Further on he introduced a subtitle The Irrationality of the 
Masses in Nazism, Fascism and Peronism, even if differentiating the attitudes and the 
social bases of those phenomena. Referring to the German and Italian cases he used 
quotation marks for the terms 'blindness' and 'rational', and he looked for other 
factors that may have caused the involvement of a large sector of the middle classes, 
who saw their social standing seriously threatened by the economic and social turmoil 
following the end of the First World War. 
It is easy to pardon someone for considering irrational — or even pathological — 
the support for Hitler. But is it so obvious that those who voted for the communists, 
or, on the other ideological hemisphere for the conservative volkish parties, were 
exempt from such traits? In the case of Peronism, Germani stated that 'there is no 
doubt that the road followed by the working class must be considered irrational; the 
rational thing would have been to accept the democratic method'. However, he then 
argues, in a somewhat contradictory fashion, that the support of the masses was not 
due to 'a blind irrationality', and dedicates a large part of his studies to 
understanding the motives of the popular sectors for supporting someone who was 
securing them a better place under the sun.16 
15 Mariano Plotkin, 'The Changing Perceptions of Peronism', repeatedly rejects what he considers 
interpretations based on the pathological nature of the movement, bagging together Borges' tea-party 
sallies and the opinions of contributors to Victoria Ocampo's journal Sur with Marx's theory of 
Bonapartism as interpreted by his local Trotskyite disciple Jorge Abelardo Ramos (pp. 31 and 33). 
16 Integration politico de las masasy el totalitarismo (Buenos Aires, 1956), pp. 4, 17, 20, 24 and 25. In his 
Autoritarismo, fascismo e classi popolari (Bologna, 1975), which incorporates revised versions of his earlier 
book, Germani adds an 'Excursus about the degree of "rationality" of the middle class masses in 
fascism, and of those of the popular class in national populism', where he states that 'it does not seem 
that the hypothesis about "irrationality" is applicable to national populism' (p. 243). Significantly, he 
puts the word in quotation marks. 
The use of the criterion of irrationality to describe the mass support of the Fascist 
regimes, especially the German variety, was very common among the members of 
the Frankfurt School. Admittedly, to assign irrationality to a whole group of people is 
not the best way to establish a dialogue with them; nor did the above-mentioned 
intellectuals have the slightest intention of engaging in it. Something different 
happened in the Argentine case, especially for many understandably concerned with 
finding convergences with a working class that maintained its loyalty to the exiled 
leader. For this dialogue to have some hope of success it was necessary to avoid de-
rogatory allusions. But unfortunately sociological as much as psychological analysis 
cannot be limited by the concern not to offend the objects of study. 
Germani, even if much influenced by mass society theories, and particularly by 
Karl Mannheim and Theodor Adorno, endeavoured to differentiate the European 
processes from Peronism, and to determine the degree to which Argentine workers 
experienced a feeling of 'real freedom, completely unknown and impossible before 
the establishment of the national popular regime', But at the same time he empha-
sised such variables as psychological authoritarianism, which had been studied by 
Adorno and others. Adorno, in a work co-authored by Max Horkheimer, argued that 
his analyses were aimed at understanding 'the psychic and unconscious characteris-
tics explaining the support for a given policy that contradicts the rationally under-
stood interests of a mass of people'.17 
To sum up, rather than speaking about rationality or the lack thereof, it is better to 
refer to such more easily grasped concepts as authoritarianism, personalism, or 
emotivity. This is what, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the anarchist writer 
A. Hamon was doing, when he stated that 'in Andalusia one is an anarchist by tem-
perament, in Catalonia by a consciously argued conviction', while in the United States 
'the military discipline of the social democrats can only take shape among German 
immigrants, still impregnated by their cultural, national and racial traits'.18 In a more 
recent approach, Scott Mainwaring and Eduardo Viola comment on the tendency of 
new social movements towards 'affective orientations, expressive relations, and hori-
zontal organisation', contrasting with older movements (especially trade unions) more 
bent on 'material preoccupations, orientations towards the state, and a vertical 
organisation'. This is somewhat schematic, because it lumps together many quite dif-
ferent 'new' movements, many of which certainly have material aims.19 But the con-
ceptual differentiation remains valid, even if it should be applied with more care to the 
movements under scrutiny. 
17 La sociedad: lecciones de sociologla (Buenos Aires, 1969), p. 173. 
18 A. Hamon, El socialismy el congreso de Londres (Valencia, no date), pp. 60 and 70. See also his Psicobgia del 
socialista-anarquista (Valencia, no publisher, no date), where he maintains that 'the anarchist socialist is a 
passionate [believer]', who cannot 'fluctuate between two opposed ideas: once he has found his truth, he 
remains fixed in it', and in extreme cases 'the lack of immediate satisfaction of his wishes leads some to an indirect 
form of suicide ... and, to kill themselves, they kill others' (pp. 241, 238 and 243, author's emphasis). See also 
Temma Kaplan, Anarchists of Andalusia (Princeton, 1977). 
19 Foweraker also differentiates between 'instrumental' and 'expressive', or even 'emotional and heroic 
actions': the former would be negotiable, not the latter. See his Theorizing Social Movements (London, 
1995), pp. 42, 51 and 63; and for an anthropological grounding to such psychological variables, the 
essays in Clifford Geertz (ed.), The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (London, 1993). 
Another simplistic approach, much used at the time, is the contrast between the 
authoritarian 'criollos' or 'cabecitas negras' and the supposedly more democratic 
people of recent European origin. But, as we will see presently, fascist ideas were 
quite widespread among immigrants. On the other hand, the concept of 'criollo' 
does not refer necessarily to a person 4of colour'. The word is somewhat confusing, as 
it has changed over time, especially in Argentina, where it was used for whites born in 
America, while it later came to mean people with some Indian ancestry, or others 
without such ancestry but having lived for more than a generation in a rural or small 
town environment. To argue that Peronists were basically 'cabecitas negras', in con-
trast to the 'whiter' anti-Peronists is ridiculous, and cannot be confused with 
Germani's theory about the role of internal migrants in the genesis of Peronism. 
Probably, favourability to Peronism was higher among people with some Amerindian 
ancestry than it was among others, but as they do not form a majority of the national 
population, no mass movement can be based only on them, even if they can help tilt 
the balance. 
Yet another myth is that leftist political parties and trade unions were not con-
cerned with the interior of the country, but were only based in the city of Buenos 
Aires and a few other urban centres. This, again, is an erroneous assumption, though 
it is true that organising people immersed in a traditional culture, convincing them to 
go to the polls, and ensuring that their votes be correcdy counted was as difficult in 
Argentina as anywhere else. 
The heterogeneity of the Argentine working class: the facts 
The heterogeneity of the working class was due to a number of causes, among them 
the educational and skill levels, the foreign status of many of its members, their rural 
or urban origin, and generally the degree to which they had been affected by the pro-
cess of social mobilisation. All these variables are structural, they do not depend on 
the individual's will, but rather shape it and, together with more individual disposi-
tions, they determine their organisational experience and political involvement. 
Educational and skill levels are obvious factors making for a differentiation of life-
styles within the working class. The anarchist Humberto Correale, remembering his 
early organisational experiences contrasts his own work environment, where despite 
everything there were some guarantees and the presence of a civil society, with the 
much rougher one of the port workers, where subsistence had to be defended with 
fisticuffs if not the blade, not only against employers but also against comrades en-
rolled in rival unions, or in yellow dog (non-union worker) groups. There 'it was just 
a question of brawn; it requires a particular type of person, savage, always carrying a 
knife, who has a heroic sense of courage, machismo. Those people are generally from 
inland. Thus, their concerns were very limited'.20 
But even among port workers there were categories. An anonymous writer in the 
libertarian Solidaridad Obrera (probably its editor, baker Laureano Riera Diaz) de-
scribed in 1941 with some nostalgia their decline: 
In the old times the port workers, barrack receivers and stevedores were among 
the better paid. On the other hand, manipulating heavy loads required a long 
20 Interview with Humberto Correale, PHO-FSR. 
apprenticeship, particularly in the docks. All these things created a picturesque 
esprit de corps; the 'saqueteros' despised the green workers calling them 'tailors', 
'masons', or 'buchesand they even had their own way of dressing. Maybe due to 
the constant exercise of this bestial work, only comparable to that of the horse-
breakers in our Pampas, stevedores had an unlimited cult of courage, 'federated' 
and 'free', solving their differences with a dagger. But then machine operation 
arrived, and with it a systematic repression. And from that struggling and 
haughty guild ... today only a cohort of broken and ragged men survives.21 
In almost all ports there was intense union activity. One of them was Diamante, in 
Entre Rios, the last one accessible to transadantic ships. The stevedores were organised 
quite early, in the 1920s, by syndicalists from the USA, who had a great deal of of 
trouble fighting the numerous scabs. Soon organisation extended inland, and the 
Federation Obrera Comarcal Entrerriana was created, with its own newspaper, Avance, 
and a library, whose chairs and books — following careful scrutiny, we might suppose 
— ended in the parochial school after the 1943 coup. The Diamante port workers, 
some 700 of them, lived in an enclave near the town. In hard times they could maintain 
themselves by catching otters or cultivating stretches of land along the river left free of 
water during some months of the year.22 
Another port, Villa Constitucion, which grew because of its deep waters, better than 
those of nearby and bigger San Nicolas, served to disgorge most of the grain wealth of 
the country. During the 1920s and '30s there were always four or five ships in 
operation, and foreign sailors created a high demand for various types of bars, cheap 
hotels and other establishments of lesser repute, operating in the Barrio Chino (not that 
any oriental lived there). A strong unionism existed, based not only on port workers 
but also on the railway repair shops.23 Before Peron's accession to power there had 
been, on both sides of the provincial demarcation line (between Villa Constitucion 
and San Nicolas), a conservative hegemony, not necessarily based on a careful 
counting of votes. On the Santa Fe side the caudillo was Juan Cepeda (1869-1954), 
inclined to a popular clientele, recruited among the more marginal elements of the 
town and port, where organisations like the Sociedad Protectora del Trabajo Libre 
were thriving, adept at securing their place in the ships' holds and celebrating with 
the men in well irrigated asados and other minor tasks of the politica criolla. You may 
call this 'popular conservatism', if you will, but certainly not mobilisational. 
In the city of Buenos Aires (that is, in its inner core, the Federal District) there was 
ample freedom for union or political activity, but once its limits were transgressed, 
into industrial Avellaneda or Villa Lynch, or much more in more distant places like 
the sugar cane fields of Tucuman, Salta andjujuy, or among theyerba mate collectors, 
the mensus of Misiones, or the Patagonian estates, where many men congregated for 
sheep-shearing, in most of these places conditions were abysmal and repression 
rampant. This does not mean that organisation efforts were not conducted, or 
political action disparaged. 
21 'Los portuarios sufren actualmente un inicuo regimen de explotacion,' Solidaridad Obrera, Feb. 1941. 
Bandera Proletaria, 28 Sept. 1928, 26 Oct. 1929 and 11 Jan. 1939. 
23 Santiago Lischietti, Radiogrqjla de Villa Constitucion en tres placas (Villa Constitucion, 1989); Guildo B. 
Corres, La brocha y la tea: historia de la FORA en Villa Constitucidn (Villa Constitucion, 1992). The port 
workers union of Villa Constitucion, affiliated to the anarchist FORA, resisted Peronist influence but 
was closed down by the authorities by mid 1946 (Reconstruir, 2nd fortnight Oct. 1946). 
As early as 1907 one of the first leaders of the syndicalist group, Luis Lotito, went 
to Tucuman to see what could be done there, and wrote a series of articles about 'the 
Tucuman proletariat' (some 30,000 people by his reckoning). Until recently, he 
stated, the people only served as support for rival factions of the oligarchy, and when 
'the masters fought for whatever cause, the workers in their sugar mills hated each 
other and ceased to have anything to do with each other'. Under the miserable con-
ditions they lived in, alcoholism was the only escape. This started to change with a 
strike in 1904, quite spontaneous though finally channelled by a local pulpero, who 
sold the movement for 200 pesos. So again, after a long series of events, activists 
'were enrolled in one or the other of the bourgeois factions ... and they defended 
political parties all led by sugar mill owners'.24 
The ethnic issue could not help popping up. Confronting the patriotic agitation 
which tried to reach the criollo sectors, an imaginary character, Doricio Tacuara, wrote 
in the syndicalist organ about 'Race' and 'tradition', unmasking the gauchos de levita who 
excoriated foreign agitators, when the national bourgeoisie was also predominantly 
foreign. Another syndicalist writer, after having been in the field for a new attempt at 
unionising the people, lay down his arms and philosophised about 'the genesis of the 
idol', saying — without intent to offend — that 'the imbecility of the people creates him 
and the caudillo cannot but be the prototype of the imbecile'.25 
In the extreme south a special situation existed. The zone could be described as 
frontier territory, with some of the openness of such areas, but at the same time with the 
social tensions associated with waves of fortune-seeking newcomers, or at any rate 
workers trying to earn a few extra pesos, living under harsh conditions. In some areas 
there were large numbers of Chileans, many of them from poverty-stricken Chiloe, but 
a significant minority quite adept at union and political activity, which had a focus in 
Punta Arenas. This town thrived with leftist activism, and was the seat of the 
Federation Obrera de Magallanes, founded in 1911, with anarchist hegemony. That 
federation published El Trabqjo, and often sent delegations to nearby Rio Gallegos, in 
the province of Santa Cruz, to help in organisation efforts. At other moments the flux 
went in the opposite direction. In 1916 the Belgian consul in Rio Gallegos reported that 
'a group of Chilean federctdos from Punta Arenas had arrived in Punta Alta ... to get the 
support of the rural labourers for a strike they had declared, involving some four or five 
thousand workers'.26 The Chilean Socialist Party (founded in 1912) was always very 
strong in the northern and southern extremes of the country, where it usually got more 
votes than in Santiago or Valparaiso, on the basis of the larger concentrations in nitrate, 
24 Luis Lotito, 'El proletariado tucumano,' La Accidn Socialista, Dec. 1907 to April 1908, reproduced 
pardy in Torcuato S. Di Telia (ed.), Sindicatos como los de antes... (Buenos Aires, 1993), pp. 30, 33; and his 
chronicle in Revista Socialista International, 25 May 1909. 
25 In the syndicalist organ La Action Socialista, 8 Dec. 1909 and 29 Jan. 1910. Years later the Union 
Ferroviaria's newspaper also responded to the patriotic appeals of the Asociacion del Trabajo and its 
insubstantial 'Comite Argentino de Obreros', reminding them that the majority of local capitalists were 
also foreign, like Christophersen, Ford, Mihanovich, Rey Basadre, Dodero, as well as many other 
British and North American financiers. El Obrero Ferroviario, 1 June 1919. 
26 Rosario Giienaga de Silva, 'Los trabajadores chilenos y el nacimiento de la organization gremial en 
Santa Cruz,' in Carmen Norambuena Carrasco (ed.), tmFaltan o sobran brazos? Migrationes internas y 
fronterizas, 1850-1930 {Santiago de Chile, 1997), p. 147. 
copper and coal mining and in wool estancias and meatpacking houses, the latter an 
'Australian' pattern. Why was the same not the case in Argentina? 
In the Territory of Santa Cruz foreigners made up 69.5 per cent of the population 
in 1895, and 53.0 per cent in 1920, and more if only males of active age were counted. 
About a fifth were Chileans. In the meatpacking industry of the area, of a total of 1,111 
workers, there were only 98 Argentines. Among the foreigners was Kurt Wilkens, the 
anarchist involved in the mass revolts and bloody repression of 1921-22.27 Chilean 
militants enjoyed great prestige among the itinerant proletariat of the Argentine South, 
as attested by Chief of Police Diego Ritchie in 1919, reporting on an assembly full of 
'subversive speeches', where one of the most important speakers was a certain 
Domingo Garcia, representing the Punta Arenas Federation, easily identifiable 'be-
cause of his aspect and the consideration he received from the workers on the day of 
the meeting'.28 
In 1920 there were strikes and violent repression in Punta Arenas, which 
prompted Senator Gonzalo Bulnes to denounce the existence of a 'soviet', the refuge 
of all the people expelled from the neighbouring country.29 Combustible materials 
were gathering in Patagonia, with wider and deeper roots than commonly assumed. 
No wonder that since the beginning of the century Joaquin V. Gonzalez had worried 
about the prospect of social revolution, 'often ignited by apparendy minor causes', 
and fanned by the 'great sources of social unrest provided by Europe', combined 
with the pauperism existing in the Federal Capital.30 
In Neuquen there was also an influence from the left, though social conditions 
were not so conducive as in the extreme south. A local paper, El Neuquen, founded in 
1908, argued later that European events would be harbingers of world revolution, 
when 'Christ will rise again, reproducing the scenes of the French Revolution'. When 
the ongoing world war seemed to involve the Americas, the editor exulted: 'War! ... a 
hecatomb from which we hope a new humanity will be born'.31 At about that time 
the municipality of Neuquen had a socialist majority. 
27 Ibid., pp. 129, 133-7. 
28 Ibid., pp. 149-50. See also Osvaldo Bayer, Los vengadores de la Patagonia trdgica (Buenos Aires, 1972). 
29 Published in El Suboftcial, organ of the Circulo de Suboficiales y clases retiradas del Ejercito y de la 
Armada, Punta Arenas, 26 Sept. 1920, reproduced in Giienaga de Silva, 'Los trabajadores chilenos', p. 152. 
Already in 1919 there had been a serious strike in the Puerto Natales packinghouse, with some 20 dead, which 
entered popular memory as 'the Commune of Puerto Natales'. In 1920 another strike, in Punta Arenas, was 
violently repressed, with three dead and the anarchist Federacion Obrera Magallanica closed down. By 1935 
Puerto Natales had a socialist mayor. See the collection of documents by Carlos Vega Delgado, La masacre en la 
Federacion Obrera de Magallanes. El movimiento obrero patagmko-Jiieguino hasta 1920 (Punta Arenas, 1995); and Fabio 
Moraga VaJle, 'Vanguardias poKticas en Magallanes: el Partido Socialista Marxista,' Impactos (Punta Arenas), 
November 1997. 
30 Speeches in the Lower House of 29 July, 4 July and 20 Nov. 1901, in Obras completas, 25 vols. 
(Buenos Aires, 1935-37), vol. 5, pp. 155, 141 and 201. Regarding the poor living conditions of most of 
the working class in a supposedly prosperous time, see Robert Edward Shipley, 'On the Outside 
Looking In: A Social History of the Porteno Worker during the "Golden Age" of Argentine 
Development, 1914-1930 /PhD dissertation (Rutgers University, 1977). However, Shipley exaggerates 
the misery of the workers, and demolishes the myth that everybody could become rich, an easily 
vulnerable straw man. But his data about unemployment, standard of living and housing are valid. 
31 El Neuquen, 5 and 13 April, 27 June, 14 July and 25 Aug. 1917; Juan Carlos Chaneton, ^ainuco: los 
precursores de la Patagonia Trdgica (Buenos Aires, 1993). El Neuquen, 15, 17 and 22 Feb. and 13 March 1917. 
El Neuquen, 9 and 16 April, 8 May and 23 Oct. 1917. 
In Argentina the main equivalent of the mining areas of Chile was the sugar area 
of Tucuman, with extensions in Salta and Jujuy. But these concentrations had little 
weight contrasted with the prosperous and populated Pampean zone, and were not 
the source of most export earnings. Besides, the contrast in mentalities between the 
leaders coming from the modernised zone of the country and the criollo workers of the 
north was much greater than in Chile (which never had more than five per cent of its 
population foreign born, compared to almost 30 per cent for decades in Argentina, 
approximately from 1880 to 1930). We have already seen the reports by Luis Lotito 
about the sugar mill strikes of 1904. Another union organiser, the socialist Gregorio 
Pinto, who had travelled at about the same time, recorded his impressions of ' the sad 
mental backwardness of these men, due to the terrible conditions they live in, causing 
a colossal ignorance about their own strength and a lack of faith in their capacity for 
direct action'. In sum, sugar workers stuck to the belief that 'without a man to lead 
them' there is nothing they could do.32 Chilean socialism, because of its predomi-
nantly 'criollo' character, was more prepared to work along traditional cultural 
patterns, among them that of caudillismo, as attested by the fact that for years it had as 
its main leader a military chief, Marmaduke Grove, and by its support, in 1952, of 
the return, under democratic garb, of the erstwhile fascist-inclined dictator, Carlos 
Ibanez. 
Another national periphery, very different from the southern one, was the 
Chaco, where there was also a high presence of foreign immigrants, as in nearby 
Misiones, competing with an Amerindian or Paraguayan cheap labour, the latter 
lacking the Chileans' associationist and political experience. In 1915 the munici-
pality of the capital, Resistencia, was controlled by the Socialist Party. National 
deputy Agusrin Muzio, a socialist leader of the tanners, on a trip to the territory in 
1924 observed this fact, contrasting it with what happened in the more backward 
and much more 'criollo' Corrientes.33 
In Misiones Marcos Kaner, a Communist organiser of the foodworkers, was active 
in, and from 1928 represented the Union Sindical Argentina (USA) in the territory. 
Despite his clearly non-criollo origin, in an interview with the CGT periodical the editors 
stated that 'due to the command he [Kaner] has of the complex psychology of the 
mensus [they] have in him an unlimited trust'. In the same paper the Fraternidad 
leader Andres Resico described Kaner as having brought into the national federation 
the peculiar mentality of the men from the Argentine north.34 The above mentality, 
surely a combination of rebellion, psychological authoritarianism and need of a leader, 
appeared to militants coming from the more modern part of the country as 'complex', 
and different from their own. 
32 La Unidn Obrera (organ of the UGT) (Feb. and March 1906), and Revista Socialista International (25 
May 1909). 
33 Pablo Lacoste, El socialismo en Mendozay en la Argentina, vol. 1, p. 22; and the report by Agustin 
Muzio in Action Socialista 1 Jan 1924 (not to be confused with the equally named syndicalist paper earlier 
in the century). See also articles by Francisco Racedo, brick maker, erstwhile employee of the Tabacal 
sugar mill, about living conditions in El Chaco (USA, 20 Sept. and 27 Oct. 1939, 15 Jan 1940, and with 
intermissions up to 1 April 1946). 
34 CGTInd 20 May 1938; CGTInd, 30 June 1938; CGT, 18 Aug. 1939; CGT, 25 Dec. 1942. 
In Mendoza the Socialist Party had a majority in the Municipal Council of the 
capital in 1915.35 In 1937 it suffered a split from the left, led by Benito Marianetti, 
with the result that the short-lived Partido Socialista Obrero (PSO) was formed, 
many of whose militants later joined the communists. The PSO retained the control 
of the municipality of Godoy Cruz (an industrial suburb of Mendoza) and in 1937 
tripled the votes the old party had obtained in Mendoza. 
In Entre Rios there was a strong influence of the syndicalists, and in Conception 
del Uruguay there was a very interesting experience of grass roots organisation, 
inspired by baker Juan Balsecchi.36 Santa Fe had important centres of activity, from 
Villa Constitution to Rosario and in its extreme north, where the wood and tannin 
producing semi-feudal estates of La Forestal were organised despite constant violence 
and persecution.37 Cordoba did not provide favourable conditions for unionisation, 
but there was an active local federation, often in the hands of the communists, who 
had organised a rebellious Comite Intersindical in the early 1940s.38. In Buenos Aires 
province there were important centres of union and political activity in the capital 
city, La Plata, in the large services and hotel concentration of Mar del Plata,39 in 
Tandil's stone quarries,40 and in Bahra Blanca, which had a well-rooted Socialist 
Party organisation. Zarate, on the borders of the Parana, had a huge packinghouse 
with intense union activity. 
The foreign presence was, of course, also very dominant in the city of Buenos 
Aires. In 1935 40 per cent of the 36,650 textile workers of the Federal Capital were 
foreign born, and the proportion rose to 58 per cent if only men were considered. 
Among members of the Union de Obreros Municipales only 29.5 per cent were 
Argentine in 1928. In 1937, in the five British-owned railway companies foreigners 
made up a full 45.5 per cent of the total. They reached 63 per cent in the building 
industry in 1938, falling to 47 per cent in 1944. In the whole country still in 1947 
21.8 per cent of the economically active population was foreign born.41 Obviously 
35 The mayor, however, was not elected but appointed by the provincial governor. See Pablo I^acoste, 
Elsocialismo en Mendoza, vol. 1, pp. 22, 76. 
36 See Carmen Arnaiz, 'Un oasis en el desierto: la Union Obrera Departamental de Conception del 
Uruguay, 1920-1946,' in Torcuato S. Di Telia (ed.) Sindicatos como bs de antes... 
37 Gaston Gori, La Forestal (Buenos Aires, 1974). 
38 Cesar Tcach, Sabattinismoy peronismo: partidos politicos en Cordoba, 1943-1955 (Buenos Aires, 1991). 
39 Elisa Pastoriza and Rodolfo Rodriguez, 'Un radicalismo perdedor: las bases sociales de la UCR en 
el municipio de General Pueyrredon en la decada de 1920,' in Fernando J. Devoto and Marcela P. 
Ferrari (eds.), La construction de las democratias rioplatenses:proyectos institucionalesy prdcticas politicas, 1900-1930 
(Buenos Aires, 1994), pp. 247-68; Liliana Da Orden, '^Practicas tradicionales en un partido moderno? 
Socialismo y poder local, Mar del Plata 1916-1929', ibid., pp. 229-46. See electoral data on p. 251. 
40 See Reconstruir (2nd fortnight June 1947); La Union Obrera (set 1909); La Confederation (March 1911) 
about the 'massacre' of 1909; La Confederation (1 Feb. 1913). On May Day 1942 the Union Obrera Local 
convened a mass meeting with political leaders of the Socialist Party, the Union Civica Radical and the 
conservative Concordancia. The anarchists termed this combination a 'contubernio' promoted by the 
Stalinists, bent on a common front against fascism. See Lucia Iionetti, 'La apropiacion del espacio simbolico: 
el caso de los rituales publicos peronistas en Tandil, 1946-1955,' in Susana Bianchi and Maria Estela Spinelli 
(eds.), Actores, ideasy prayectospoliticos en la Argentina contempordnea (Tandil, 1997), pp. 179-213. 
41 Industrial Census of 1937, taken from Joel Horowitz, 'Adaptation and Change in the Argentine Labor 
Movement, 1930-1943: A Study of Five Unions,' (PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1979), 
pp. 116-17; 'El Obrero Ferroviario,' August 1, 1937, in Horowitz, op. tit., p. 264; El Obrero Municipal, special 
issue (16 Oct. 1928); Boletln de la Camara de la Construction, reproduced in David Tamarin, The Argentine Labor 
Movement, 1930-1945: A Study in the Origins of Peronism (Albuquerque, 1985), p. 42; and Gino Germani, 
electoral figures did not reflect the feelings of such a working class, in the 1930s or 
even in early 1946 when Peron won the presidency, which is not to say that those 
non-voting workers would be anti-Peronists, it simply points to the very strange char-
acter of this class. The composition of the urban labouring force was changing 
quickly though. From 1935 to 1943 the number of industrial establishments rose 
from 40,600 to 65,000, and the occupied personnel shot from 590,000 to 980,000 
(rounded figures). The trickle of 8,000 net migrants from the interior to Greater 
Buenos Aires in the early 1930s jumped to 72,000 between 1936 and 1943, and to 
11,000 from 1943 to 1947.42 
Social mobilisation and mobilisationism 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of two terms much used in 
these pages: social mobilisation and its related concept mobilisationism. Germani did set 
great store, as an explanatory variable, on the influx of internal migrants into urban 
centres during the late 1930s and early 1940s. In this he was taking into account 
similar events occurring in other Latin American countries, especially Brazil where 
they were the basis of the popular agitation known as queremismo.43 However, for him 
the main variable was not that of internal migration, but rather the concept of social 
mobilisation, one of whose manifestations, but not the only one, is internal migration 
from rural or small town areas. 
The concept of social mobilisation can be derived from the Marxist hypotheses 
about the social, cultural and political effects of industrial development. In other 
words, of the effects of modernisation, if that term may be used. As a matter of fact, 
Marx was, in some sense of the term, a 'theoretician of modernisation', or even of the 
contrast between 'civilisation and barbarism'.44 For him, as long as industrial and 
technological development were not sufficiendy advanced it was impossible for the 
working class to adopt an independent stance, except for a small minority. This was 
Estruetura social de la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1955), p. 136. 
42 Alberto Ciria, Partidosy poder en la Argentina moderna, 1930-1946, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires, 1986), p. 85; 
and Gino Germani, Estructura social de la Argentina, p. 75. 
43 Angela de Castro Gomes, A irwengao do trabalhismo (Sao Paulo, 1988). 
44 Marx, condemning the Russian repression of the Polish insurgency of 1863, said that 'only a 
civilised government ruling barbarian masses can conceive and execute such a plan', adding that 
Europe was menaced by 'Asiatic barbarism under Muscovite leadership'. Karl Marx, 'La mision 
europea de Polonia,' speech delivered in I/jndon, 22 Jan. 1867, published in a selection edited by Luis Pan, 
Marxy Engels contra Rusia, pp. 116 and 119. A few years earlier, in the Initial Manifesto of the International 
Workers Association, he pointed to the 'immense and unobstructed usurpations of that barbarous power 
whose head is in Saint Petersburg' (ibid., p. 104). Maybe these are journalistic taunts, but in a more 
theoretical context Friedrich Engels, in an article for the Neue Reinische fitting, of 20 Aug. 1848, argued that 
'the vast cultivable lands between the Baltic and the Black Sea can be saved from their feudal-patriarchal 
barbarism by an agrarian revolution which will change their peasants — serfs and forced workers — into 
free property holders' (ibid., p. 100). In the matter of condemning popular movements without acceptable 
aims Marx did not spare epithets. Thus, for example, when describing the Taiping rebellion (which Perry 
Anderson considers the most important popular struggle of the nineteenth century) he claimed that 'for the 
popular masses it was an even greater abomination than that of the old masters ... a grotesque and 
repugnant reign of destruction', while its adherents had been recruited among 'lumpen elements, vagrants 
and low life types' (in Perry Anderson, El estado absolutista (Madrid, 1979, pp. 509 and 514—15)). See also 
Carlos Moore, 'Were Marx and Engels Racists?: The Prolet-Aryan Outlook of Marxism,' Berkeley Journal of 
Sociology, vol.19 (1974-75), pp. 125-56. 
because the power and the prestige of the upper classes would be such as to incorpo-
rate as a clientele large sectors of the popular classes, rural or urban, new or old, in 
the absence of a strong trade union and political experience acquired in high-tech-
nology productive units.45 Admittedly, under extremely harsh economic conditions, 
or war-induced crises, or religious and cultural commotions, mass rebellions could 
spread among the more miserable strata of the population, giving rise to slave revolts 
or peasant jacqueries. But all of these, in the Marxist analysis, were destined to 
failure, or to an apparent success, soon capitalised by the elites that inevitably would 
lead them. 
To the extent that wide sectors of the popular classes are still subject to the influ-
ence of local notables or their urban equivalents, they will continue to be a pliable 
basis for conservative or bourgeois politicians. The process of breakdown of that con-
servative social control structure may be called social mobilisation. This term has been 
used with somewhat different meanings in the literature. Here I use it in the sense 
given to it by Karl Deutsch and Germani, among others.46 It simply implies the ero-
sion of the links of a traditional community and the end of deference towards social 
superiors. It does not refer to the existence of a new activism, even if it is not incom-
patible with it. The earlier formulation of this idea can be traced as far back as Adam 
Smith, who of course did not give it that name, but described it admirably, if the 
overtones of the moralist are discounted: 
While [the migrant] remains in a country village his conduct may be attended to, 
and he may be obliged to attend to it himself. In this situation, and in this situation 
only, he may have what is called a character to lose. But as soon as he comes into a 
great city, he is sunk in obscurity and darkness. His conduct is observed by nobody, 
and he is therefore very likely to neglect it ... and abandon himself to every sort of 
low profligacy and vice.47 
Some authors have used the term mobilisation to denote a particular activism of a 
social group, ready to fight for its way of life and its interests. For Charles Tilly it is 
the first stage in a sequence that leads to something more solid, and thus he has tided 
one of his books From Mobilization to Revolution,48 Also in current language the term 
mobilisation is often used to denote an activity oriented to some clearly stated aims. I 
prefer to reserve for that the related concept of political mobilisation, but I am not pre-
pared to fight for a definition. I do believe that it is necessary to have in mind a 
gradient, which does not have to coincide with a unidirectional historical sequence, in 
three phases: 
45 See, for descriptions of the 'underdeveloped' end of the typology, Eric Hobsbawm, Los campesinosy 
la polUica (Barcelona, 1976), and his 'Peasants and Rural Migrants in Politics,' in Claudio Veliz (ed.), The 
Politics of Conformity (London, 1967), pp. 43-65; Joel Migdal, Peasants, Politics and Revolution (Princeton, 
1974); and Hamza Alavi, Las closes campesinasy las lealtades primordiales (Barcelona, 1976). An interesting 
study of the multiple and contradictory effects of modernisation on a primitive environment can be 
found in Robert Wasserstrom, Class and Society in Central Chiapas (Berkeley, 1983), written long before the 
more recent events in that area, especially p. 212 and chapter 6. 
4,3 Karl Deutsch, 'Social Mobilization and Political Development,' American Political Science Review, vol. 
55, no. 3 (Sept. 1961), pp. 493-514.; Gino Germani, Sociedady polUica en una epoca de transicidn. 
47 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776), quoted in Donald Winch, Adam Smith's Politics: An Essay in 
Historiographic Revision (Cambridge, 1979), p. 117. 
48 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA, 1978), especially, pp. 69-84; J.P. Nettl, 
Political Mobilization: A Sociological Analysis of Methods and Concepts (New York, 1967), pp. 107-20. 
1. Rupture of traditional bonds: social mobilisation, in Germani's sense. 
2. Agitation and activity towards given goals, short of a revolutionary kind: political 
mobilisation, in the sense here adopted, or simply mobilisation, as used by Tilly. 
3. Involvement in a more confrontationist and violent outcome: revolution for Tilly, 
or a particularly radical variety of political mobilisation, as I would prefer to call 
it. In fact, political mobilisation has many other forms apart from revolution, 
even class-based ones, including the social democratic and the populist varieties. 
The social mobilisation of masses without much experience of autonomous organisa-
tion implies their becoming available for incorporation into a peculiar type of political 
expression, which may be called mobilisationism,49 As long as a solid autonomous 
organisation is not acquired, the more usual experience will be the incorporation into 
populist movements, under a leadership I have called mobilisational caudillismo. Once 
they have acquired an organisational experience the popular classes are ready for a 
more autonomous political expression, whether in social democratic or in less ideo-
logical coalitions, like the United States' Democratic Party. When, as in the 
European experience, social mobilisation takes place more gradually, conservatism 
retains its strength, and the slow accumulation of organisational experience by the 
working class does not generate a large store of available but not yet autonomously 
organised recruits, thus depriving populism of its cohorts.50 
In other words, for the acquisition by the working class of its own autonomous 
political expression it is not enough to have a collapse of traditional ties, i.e. social 
mobilisation. An autonomous organisational experience is required, which generally 
advances at a different speed. In countries of the periphery the breakdown of tradi-
tional structures, under the pressure of international forces, occurs more quickly than 
in the paradigmatic British and other European cases. 
The working class sector of recent rural origins is inevitably large in early stages of 
industrialisation, or even later on, when intense changes take place. In the periphery 
there is the added element of over-urbanisation, due to a combination of intense rural 
push and weak industrial pull, thus generating the swelling of petty commercial and 
service sectors, not to speak of the marginals and under- or unemployed. In some 
cases it is possible that ample sectors of those recendy migrated people, having moved 
with their entire family, or more slowly, or for other motives, have not yet completely 
49 Availability fdisponibilidad') is a concept used by Germani, and also by Reinhard Bendix, Nation Building and 
Citizenship, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, 1977), p. 428; Juan Linz, 'Cinco siglos de historia espanola: cuantificacion y 
comparacion,' in David Landes et al., Las dimensiones delpasado: estudios de historia comparatwa (Madrid, 1974), pp. 
165-273, especially pp. 209-10; Joel Migdal, Peasants, Politics and Revolution (Princeton, 1974), for whom social 
mobilisation is 'a process of abandonment of traditional patterns and commitments, but [which] has not 
necessarily led to the adoption of the ways and processes associated with modernization' (p. 13). 
50 It is possible that, fifty years after its initiation as a mass mobilisation phenomenon, Peronist trade 
unionism is heading towards the 'North American' pragmatic model. For that to happen there is still a need 
for some more shedding of the practices associated with verticalism and other corrupt practices, partially 
developed as a defensive response to persecution at the hands of both military and civilian regimes between 
1955 and 1983. Regarding the Nazi or fascist experiences in Europe, they were mostly, even if not solely, 
grounded in the middle classes, in what Germani has called secondary mobilisation, of people who already had 
an urban and associationist experience, but were hit by desperate economic and cultural circumstances. 
broken with some form of traditional loyalties, like in Indian panchayats reproduced 
in the cities, and therefore may be said not to be even socially mobilised.51 
Demographic data are easier to measure, while only indirect inferences can be 
used to determine to what extent a given person or group is still under the influence 
of the traditional deferential hierarchies. Migration to the cities is very likely to pro-
duce the fissure of the cake of custom, but that fissure can also happen as a result of 
moving within the rural milieu itself, to plantations and the like, or without moving, 
through the impact of radio, television and increased communications of all types. Of 
course a war, with intense recruitment, inevitably generates a traumatic and massive 
form of social mobilisation, not necessarily accompanied by self-organisation, as in 
the episodes preceding the Russian Revolution. 
Mass society and popular mentalities 
The evolutionary perspective of liberal or social democratic roots was definitely 
broken with the accession of Nazism to power, and with the Second World War. In 
contrast to the conservative/labour bipolarity of much of the western world, the 
Weimar crisis was associated with the decline of the middle strata. For once, the 
famous proletarianisation had happened, but the results were contrary to expecta-
tions. Social scientists, many of them with a Marxist background, started revising 
their concepts, seeking new lines of cleavage, crises of social classes, and structural 
tensions, which may help in understanding the new phenomena, always within a 
somewhat deterministic frame, though now in greater detail. Psychology was also 
brought into play, based on Freudian views on the strange origins of human 
behaviour. Following Emile Durkheim, attention was also focused on the destruc-
tion of the primordial village community, or its small town neighbourhood 
equivalents, and on the impact of living in large, anonymous cities or work 
environments.52 It was also important to understand the social roots of more or less 
spontaneous protest movements appealing to 'disruptive' tactics, extolled by some 
observers from the left as a more efficient method of fighting capitalism than the 
more standard practices of reformist associations, from trade unions to political 
parties, often involved in the very system they hoped to change. 
Social actors that stimulated more or less spontaneous explosions were of very 
different hues. As long as they were the sociologists who wrote about the subject 
and led the sit-ins there was not much of a problem. It is quite another matter 
when groups with very solid interests of their own enter the scene, like those associ-
ated from the start with Peronism, and with many similar phenomena in other 
parts of the world, first of all in Latin America. The study of this minority, but 
strategic, elite is as important, in order to understand populism, as the analysis of 
the popular contingents that provide its mass support. 
51 Oscar Lewis, 'Urbanization Without Breakdown: A Case Study,' The Scientific Monthly (1975), pp. 
31-41. 
52 Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933-1944, 2nd ed. (New York, 
1966 [1st ed. 1942]); Arthur Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, 1959); Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer, La sodedad: lecdoms de sociologla (Buenos Aires, 1969); Alejandro Blanco, 'Gino Germani: las 
ciencias del hombre and el proyecto de una voluntad polltica ilustrada,' Punto de Vista (Dec. 1998), pp. 42-8. 
In Marxist theory this channelling of mass popular feelings by an elite far removed 
from it, and with often contrasting interests, was called Bonapartism. This phenomenon 
was supposed to spread among popular sectors without much of an associationist expe-
rience of their own, at a juncture in which capitalist domination was in crisis. As a result 
of this crisis bourgeois parties had lost their capacity to obtain electoral majorities, and 
therefore the liberal constitutional regime ceased to be an instrument of control by the 
ruling classes. In such predicament, they would be prepared to forego their full leader-
ship role, depositing it in a person, who for fortuitous reasons, had the confidence of the 
masses, stimulating, and at the same time controlling, their demands. This service, of 
course, was provided at a price, but without fundamentally affecting the system, even if 
eventually some members of the propertied classes might suffer persecution, seen as a 
sort of collective reinsurance. 
In his analysis of this type of regime, Marx did not dwell on the factors likely to gen-
erate such a Bonapartist leader. He did not dedicate much attention, either, to the 
social conditions making a working class vulnerable to this kind of appeal. It is possible 
to take some elements from this Marxist analytical tradition, with its eschatological ele-
ments about the near-end of capitalism, and leaving aside considerations about a 
particular stage of attitudes describable as class consciousness, based on the 'correct' inter-
pretation of historical forces, it becomes necessary, then, to study the complex of struc-
tural traits, tensions, of combinations of social psychological aspects, which make highly 
probable (a) the emergence of one or more elite(s) capable of integrating the masses 
under their leadership, and (b) the existence of a receptive mass, which has overcome its 
traditional deference to social superiors, without reaching the more advanced praxis of 
autonomously organised working people. 
But which have been in Argentina the underlying currents of the popular 
mentality, the bases of a counterculture capable of surfacing in the most varied 
manner?53 To simplify, I would say that these are basically two: namely, mobilisational 
caudillismo, and rank and file associationism. These two currents have, of course, numer-
ous variants, ramifications and combinations. In other countries of Latin America 
these currents can also be identified, though in different proportions, and linked to 
different historical references. Let us consider them in some detail. 
1. Mobilisational caudillismo 
To avoid believing that Argentine history started on 17 October 1945, or the day 
Errico Malatesta stepped down from the ship bringing him from Italy, it is advis-
able to go back as far as possible in search of the bases of a popular counterculture. 
One might even reach such mass uprisings as Tupac Amaru's in Peru or the slave 
revolution in Haiti. But without going so far, in Argentina it is necessary to con-
sider the involvement of much of the 'criollo' population in what I have termed 
mobilisational caudillismo, ranging from Juan Manuel de Rosas to Martin Guemes 
or Jose Gervasio de Artigas. Not that they were the same, but for the purposes of 
this analysis they can be grouped together into the model of paternalist caudillismo, 
at the same time mobilising and controlling a certain mass following. This dual role 
53 The concept of 'mentality' is much used by the French school of the Annates. See Carlo Ginzburg, 
The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth Century Miller (Baltimore, 1980). 
is clear in Rosas, but it can also be found in Giiemes or Artigas, even if one is more 
based on establishment support than the other variant.54 Rosismo, despite its an-
chorage in the establishment, survived long among the rural population, and we 
may suppose also among internal migrants to the cities, of which there were many 
before the European tide. 
In mobilisational caudillismo there is a strong component of paternalism, but it is no 
longer the classical conservative paternalism of the rural or small town notables, be-
cause it is based on the channelling of popular feelings of resentment against the upper 
classes, which is clearly absent in its traditional, ancien regime variety. In order for the 
mobilisational caudillista formula to gel two factors must be present, as already pointed 
out, at the level of the masses and at that of the elites. Among those elites certain social 
forces must be operating, which transform a significant minority in an elite with feelings 
and interests at odds with the status quo and the majority of their own class. At the 
popular level other factors must be present, capable of breaking down the deference 
they traditionally have towards their social superiors.55 
In Latin America there have been conservative phenomena which have incorpo-
rated some mass support, not only from peasants or the extremely poor, but also 
from run-of-the-mill working class sectors. They are often called 'popular 
conservative', to distinguish them from more upper- or middle-class conservatism. 
This is the case, in Argentina, of the political machine organised by Alberto Barcelo 
in a zone of the province of Buenos Aires that included the industrial centre of 
Avellaneda. This machine, under the name of Partido Provincial, was long split from 
the main Conservative Party. Perhaps in this way it channelled popular feelings con-
trary to the national status quo, but it was clearly not of a mobilisational kind. In a 
sense it would be nearer to some more recent provincial phenomena, like the 
Movimiento Popular Neuquino of the Sapag family, of Peronist origin, and would be 
differentiated from more orthodox conservative models, like the present-day 
Democrats in Mendoza or Liberales and Autonomistas in Corrientes, and of course 
the bulk of the Partido Democrata Nacional in the period under consideration. 
The fact that Barcelo could express localist sentiments in his fief helps to explain 
the weakness of socialist electoral support in Avellaneda, though persecution and 
scarcely honest counting of votes helped. In some cases the conservatives attempted 
to organise union groups, but with extremely limited success. Thus, the official jour-
nal of the CGT informed in 1941 that a certain Salgado, municipal employee in San 
Isidro (an affluent neighbourhood of Greater Buenos Aires), under the guidance of 
the local conservative boss Ernesto de las Carreras, had installed a masons' union in 
nearby Martinez, using the headquarters of the Partido Democrata Nacional.56 This 
party, in 1931, had included in its list of candidates for the Lower House two well-
54 Tulio Halperin Donghi has analysed this issue in his 'El surgimiento de los caudillos en el marco de 
la sociedad rioplatense postrevolucionaria,' Estudios de Historia Social, vol. 1, no. 1 (Oct. 1965), pp. 121-
49 and in De la revolucion de la independencia a la confederacion rosista (Buenos Aires, 1968). 
55 Traditional societies often have, therefore, a 'stable' conservative situation, though, admittedly, this 
can suffer occasional explosions of popular wrath, mainly the peasant jacqueries. Most of the time, 
though, the social order is quite solid, especially where there are no major ethnic differences between 
lord and peasant. In modern industrial society, those massive violent explosions are less frequent, and 
are replaced by a constant clash of interests between employers and labour, with its concomitant 
political party bipolarity. 
CGT, 11 July 1941. 
known and genuine railway unionists, Bernardo Becerra and Alberto Cortes Arteaga, 
both duly elected.57 
In Valentin Alsina, a sector of Avellaneda, there was a large textile concentration, 
and there the Union Obrera Textil, controlled by socialists and communists, 
launched during the 1930s an organisational campaign. This effort failed, as was later 
explained, because of lack of civic consciousness, plus the hasty tactics of some enthu-
siasts, with the result that the influence of 'the agents of caudilhs who operate in that 
area' was consolidated. This was surely a reference to Barcelo or his stalwarts, who 
through a combination of well-provided asados, occasional help in hard times, and 
tough police, co-opted a lot of the poorer population.58 It is significant that Humberto 
Correale, the very militant anarchist from Avellaneda, has condescending words for 
Barcelo, to the point of saying: 
OK, he was paternalist. But people came from all quarters to his home (and it 
was a procession) to have their problems solved. Don Alberto gave them a card, 
and their problem was solved. But the scoundrels in his entourage never an-
tagonised the working class movement. Some petty thieves helped us, occasion-
ally, during a strike, giving a hand in getting out the carneros (yellow dogs). As for 
Don Alberto Barcelo, never, never did he order an act of violence against 
strikers. He was a man of very humble origins, [who started as] a peonacho in the 
municipality, practically illiterate.59 
This is why some people consider Barcelo (or his more successful disciple Manuel 
Fresco) as having introduced some elements of the formula which made Peron famous. 
But the differences are abysmal, because neither barcelonismo nor jresquismo stirred up 
such an alarm and hatred as Peronism did. 
The classical orilleros (inhabitants of peripheral poor barrios) prior to the European 
tide, or contemporaneous with its early stages, were mostly recent rural migrants, and 
they brought with them the traditions of autochthonous mobilisational caudillismo. 
Ricardo Caballero, a Radical Party criollista leader who passed through a short 
anarchist experience, to move later to the right, was very strong in his condemnation of 
the foreign mentality of the socialists and other progressive groups, extolling instead 'the 
haughty native guilds \gremios] of stevedores, carters, coach drivers, labourers in storage 
houses, herdsmen, movers of livestock, and butchers', among whom it was very difficult 
'to spot a Russian'.60 Later on, when the mass of European immigrants arrived, they 
brought with them a mixture of local traditions. Those from the south of Italy and 
Spain, particularly, were of overwhelmingly rural or small town origin, never won over 
in their own countries by leftist propaganda. But all of them in practice formed for a 
time ethnic ghettos (not necessarily residentially separated), easily influenced by activists 
57 Becerra was vice-president of the Union Ferroviaria under Antonio Tramonti (interview with Jose 
Domenech, PHO-ITDT, p. 49), labour delegate to the International Labour Organization in 1930 (CGT 1 
May 1934), but he died before taking up his representative job. Cortes Arteaga was another important 
member of the Union Ferroviaria, and in 1933 Luis Cerutti, General Secretary of the CGT, asked him to 
intervene in favour of some imprisoned activists. 
58 El Obrero Textil (Dec. 1938). See also Norberto Folino, Barcelo, Ruggierito y el populismo oligarquico 
(Buenos Aires, 1983). 
59 Interview with Humberto Correale, PHO-FSR. 
60 Ricardo Caballero, Hipolito Tiigoyeny k revolution radical de 1905 (Buenos Aires, 1975), pp. 140-1. In this 
author the rosista ideological element is very clear. 
of their own nationality. For these activists the foreigners formed a sort of 'captive 
audience', much more receptive to their message than in their own countries of origin. 
The leftist, even revolutionary message was grafted onto a more ancestral popular 
authoritarianism, giving a very peculiar mixture. 
What was, then, the charge of counterculture these new inhabitants of Argentina 
brought with them? They certainly carried a heavy component of paternalistic con-
servatism, which of course did not originally express itself in mobilisational or anti-
status quo moulds, but could easily be transmuted into them. Immigrants, by the 
simple fact of having crossed the ocean, underwent a process of social mobilisation, 
that is, they broke their traditional moorings. They became an 'available mass', easily 
reached by any activist of their own nationality who inveighed against the system, 
which in the early stages was treating them quite badly, despite the possibilities for 
bettering themselves, which were not so obvious nor applicable to. They thus 
acquired to a large extent leftist attitudes, even if distant culturally from their tenets, 
in contraposition to what was the case with those who came from the more industri-
alised parts of Italy or Spain, or from other European origins. It is also necessary to 
take into account the influence of Catholicism, though the activists of this origin who 
came in the mass migration were probably lesser in number than those of a leftist 
persuasion. Even if the trauma of emigration eroded their traditional values, the roots 
of their ancient beliefs were still alive, and would easily sprout again given the 
occasion.61 
The model of mobilisational caudillismo, on the other hand, was also present in 
the historical and cultural traditions of European immigrants, to begin with in 
Louis Napoleon himself, and then through fascism and the Hispanic 
authoritarianism of General Miguel Primo de Rivera and his son Jose Antonio. But 
it was not easy to integrate them into similar experiences if led by people of a more 
native or criollo origin. That convergence might come, if at all, later on, when their 
children acceded to citizenship, maintaining many of their ancestral values.62 
Fascism generated, of course, a great deal of resistance among working class 
activists in the trade union and political fields, but for many among the immigrant 
mass and their descendants it was normal to identify to some extent with the gov-
ernment of 'their own country'. In fact, in the Rio de la Plata, Brazil and the 
United States, there was a considerable support for II Duce among the Italian 
community. One of the founders of the American Fascist Party was Giovanni di 
Silvestro, who had started his career as an extreme left socialist. Gaetano 
Salvemini, an intensely anti-fascist intellectual and activist, argued that the great 
majority of the bourgeois sectors among the immigrants were favourable to fascism. 
61 See Fernando Devoto, Esludios sobre la emigration italiana a la Argentina en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX 
(Napoli, 1991), especially his chapter 8, 'Catolicismo y anticlericalismo en un barrio italiano de Buenos 
Aires (La Boca) en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX', pp. 199-229. 
62 Zeev Sternhell, La droite revolutionnaire: les origines frarqaises du fascisms, 1885-1914 (Paris, 1978), and his 
M droite ni gauche: Pideologie fasciste en France, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1987), as well as his joint work with Mario 
Sznajder and Maia Asheri, El nacimiento de la ideologla fascista. For Spain see Shlomo Ben-Ami, Fascism 
from Above: The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain (Oxford, 1983). In Chile the Partido Nacional 
Socialista (explicitly Nazi) defined itself as 'on the left', and voted for the Popular Front in 1938, as a 
reaction to the repression it underwent under President Arturo Alessandri. See Mario Sznajder, 'A Case 
of Non-European Fascism: Chilean National Socialism in the 1930sJournal of Contemporary History, vol. 
28 (1993), pp. 269-96. 
He estimated that some 50 per cent of the total cared only for their own interests, 
five per cent were clearly fascists, ten per cent antagonistic but much divided, and 
the remaining 35 per cent could be easily influenced by official propaganda. He 
also pointed out that in the two clothing workers unions, with 60,000 members 
(mosdy Jews and Italians), fascist efforts to control them 'had never succeeded, even 
if they had made some headway in local areas'. Which, of course, can also be 
interpreted a contrario sensu.63 
An interesting example of this mentality can be found in an immigrant who came 
very young to Argentina, rose successfully into the middle class, as an electrical 
technician, and later joined the Peronist movement, contributed to the creation of the 
Electrical Workers Union in San Nicolas (Province of Buenos Aires) and became a 
member of the provincial legislature. Francisco Galizia (1905-79), from a large 
northern Italian artisan family, arrived in Argentina when he was 17. He did not 
have much interest in politics, but he recalled his early experience in his home 
country, where he had joined Mussolini's enthusiasts. He soon became disenchanted, 
because he sensed that the movement was being filled with opportunists and 
placemen. In his memoirs, however, he still maintained very ambivalent attitudes to 
the whole subject: 
the Axis represented strong governments, that had replaced the liberal 
democratic system they considered ineffectual, in bad repute and decaying. 
Their efficiency was demonstrated by the admirable results obtained in 
Germany and Italy, which, overcoming the total annihilation they had suffered, 
had been elevated to the first ranks among the nations. The system, however, 
involved the establishment, more or less openly, of a dictatorship not free from 
evils, maybe even greater ones 
But he still believed that Mussolini was 'a real, practical, honest and sincere defender 
of the proletarian class, and above all a great patriot. Endowed with an extraordinary 
disposition [...] he proclaimed that Italians had nothing to expect from outside, and 
that in order to fulfil their just expectations they needed order, unity, discipline, and 
everybody's concerted efforts'.64 
Another episode reflecting his attitudes, which must have been shared by many in 
his position, occurred when, soon after his arrival, he attended a political meeting, 
where the speaker was 'inveighing against Mussolini, with gibes against Italy, which 
wounded me like a dagger. My reaction was immediate, I opened my way among the 
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crowd placing myself near the podium, where I remained furious like a bull'. The 
young immigrant soon exploded violendy, with imaginable consequences, as 
'thousands of eyes converged on [him]', though he got away without greater mishap. 
He had the luck of being near a Marine non-commissioned officer, who 'calm and 
haughty in his impeccable uniform approached me and offered me a cup of coffee', 
explaining: 
— Do you realise what you have done? 
— Wouldn't you react in the same way if someone offended your own 
country? I asked. 
— I don't blame you for that, but for your temerity. Those people are furious 
antifascists and you can thank God for not having been lynched 
Galizia was pushed towards participation in the new unionism without any previous 
record in that field, as he was an administrative cadre in the company, living in San 
Nicolas since 1935, in charge of controlling abusive electricity connections, and not in 
the least all sympathetic to union activists (despite valuing Mussolini's socialist ideas). 
He recounts that after the 1943 coup, being 'totally foreign to politics and to the events 
of those days ... completely dedicated to my work and my home, I was surprised to be 
approached by a group of employees of the company'. Despite his 'considerable 
earnings' he agreed to represent the lads in discussions with the employers, and soon 
became the founder of a new Sindicato de Luz y Fuerza of the Parana zone, later fed-
erated at national level. Predictably, the company tried to dissuade him offering a sum 
of money, but he rejected the offer and became a union leader, certainly pragmatic but 
not for that less honest. 
Galizia also took part in the creation of the 'ephemeral, but glorious' Partido 
Laborista, was elected provincial legislator and then member of the 1949 Constituent 
Assembly. Linked to Domingo Mercante (governor of the province), he co-operated 
with Manuel Fossa (brother of woodworker Mateo), the Peronist dissident who contrib-
uted, with Cipriano Reyes, to the maintaining of an independent Laborista structure 
opposing Peron's decision to subdue it.65 
Other union activists, combining a certain initial leftism with Mussolinian sympathies 
and later support for Peronism, may be represented by Rafael Ginocchio, a foodworker 
(fideero, that is, pasta maker) born in Italy in 1912. His father was a middle-scale peasant, 
and they came over when Rafael was 12 years old. He soon became an activist among the 
Jideeros, associated with the anarchist FORA, and his own sympathies hovered between 
socialism and anarchism. In 1937 his union abandoned its more radical ideologies and 
joined the CGT, within the Federacion de la Alimentacion, controlled by the 
communists. He believed himself as one of the main opponents of the leadership of that 
federation, and soon became a follower of General Peron. 
Fideero workers numbered about 25,000 in 1926, but affiliation was scarce. 
Towards the 1930s, under anarchist leadership, they had some 140 members in the 
65 Manuel Fossa, in his interview in the Oral History Program (PHO-ITDT), mentions Galizia as a 
comrade in that effort. Galizia himself glosses over this episode in his book, though he reproduces an 
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there is an allusion to 'those who afterwards betrayed him' (p. 121). For the references in the above texts 
see pp. 51-52, 79-87, 100. 
capital. When in the early 1940s they joined the Federation they were 700 strong. 
Immediately after the 1943 coup the union was dissolved, along with the others in the 
field of alimentation, but was reconstituted on 15 June 1944. Ginocchio, now in posses-
sion of a credential from the Secretaria de Trabajo y Prevision Social, thrust himself 
into an organisational campaign, entering freely in the workplaces and drawing 
people into the union in their droves. Thus, in 1946 he could claim to have 2,000 
members. Afterwards, for several years, he was a member of the Comision 
Administrativa of the CGT, though he later fell from favour. 
For Ginocchio the identification with Peron had a highly emotional component, 
as he felt that the general expressed 'what I feel and that due to lack of talent I cannot 
express; it would seem as though he had become incarnate in me, saying what I have 
been feeling since I was born'. About Mussolini he had firm opinions. He believed 
that D Duce 'being unable to govern with the socialists, had to change his methods', 
first using castor oil and the manganello (police baton) and then persuasion. When 
Ginocchio travelled to Italy ten years after Mussolini's execution, he remarked that 
'95 per cent of Italians mourned his death and the great works he had left in Italy. I 
believe that between Nazism and fascism there is a basic difference, as Mussolini did 
not persecute a given race ... For me fascism was one of the political movements that 
will have no doubt many followers in the world'. Could it be that he had this same 
mixture of ideas when he was a libertarian and socialist sympathiser, and an activist 
in a FORA-affiliated union?66 
The conservative influences which could exert themselves among the immigrant 
communities were clearly described in an article in a paper edited by socialist leader 
Nicolas Repetto. During the 1924 elections for governor of the province of Santa Fe 
the Church had openly backed the conservative candidate, opposing the anticlerical 
Iisandro de la Torre. The Catholic priests hurled biblical threats of hail, locusts and 
other plagues, taking advantage of the fact that 'the Santa Fe countryside, inhabited 
by rude European workers, was receptive' to those appeals, especially in 'far-away 
places, where the interchange of ideas and news is difficult'. Repetto added that 
'even in Rosario, in the Arroyito neighbourhood church, a certain priest harangued 
his flock in a picturesque Italo-criollo language'.67 
As for fascism, the communist leaders of the Sindicato Obrero de la Industria 
Metalurgica (SOIM), condemning Mussolini's jailing of several deported activists from 
Argentina, hoped that 'many naive comrades, who like Mussolini, will now understand 
that fascism is the worst enemy of the working people'. Which can be interpreted as 
reflecting a perception that fascist ideology had a wide following among some sectors of 
the population.68 Esteban Piacenza, founder of the fairly radical tenant farmers' 
Federation Agraria Argentina, also became ideologically fascist, while retaining the 
leadership of his organisation.69 From this and other cases it follows that mobilisational 
caudillismo was not a criollo characteristic, but was also quite widespread among the 
immigrant communities. 
66 Interview with Rafael Ginocchio, PHO-ITDT. See especially pp. 26, 23 and 29-30. 
67 Action Socialista (12 Feb. 1924), pp. 202-202. 
68 El Obrero Metalurgico (Feb.-Mar. 1938). 
69 Jose Grunfeld, Memorias de un amrqidsta (Buenos Aires, 2000), pp. 242-3. 
It would have been quite difficult to incorporate the mobilisational caudillista pat-
tern into working class associations, because trade union activity was overwhelmingly 
expressed through associationist models, and based on a majoritarian foreign base. 
But as time went by, with the Argentinisation of the workforce, the mobilisational 
pattern imposed itself upon the others, giving birth to the 'verticalista' form of or-
ganisation, causing a violent trauma in the existing system and a confrontation with 
the old leadership. But let us now examine some aspects of the other countercultural 
tradition, rank and file associationism. 
2. Rank andfile associationism 
Coffee houses, as celebrated famously by Enrique Santos Discepolo, were the 
bulwark of sociability in most cities and the basis of political party centres, cells, local 
unions, athenaeums, cultural groups and co-operative units, where political and 
union activists thrived. In those places the 'mezcla milagrosa de sabihondos y 
suicidas' was formed, with people like 
Jose, el de la quimera, 
Marcial, que aun creey espera, 
y elflaco Abel, que se nos fue 
pero aun me guxa. 
This imagery is sufficiendy strong to be used as a symbol of a deep counterculture, 
operating at somewhat higher stratification levels than the previously described one 
of popular caudillismo. The thick tissue of social relations in local barrios, with a mixture 
of skilled workers, white collar employees, small traders, bohemian intellectuals and 
students, plus other similar types, provided sustenance to a kind of political action 
which contrasted with the one based on caudillista leadership. This mixture implied a 
greater amount of egalitarianism, and it was more difficult to develop, because it re-
quires a greater reliance on the resources of the working class and other lower middle 
class or professional groups.70 
Associational experience was clearly the basis of the early union and party experi-
ences of the Left in Argentina, as it was in Chile. But in contrast to its neighbour, in 
Argentina the beginnings of popular associationism were to a large extent rooted in the 
foreign immigrant groups, often organised for mutual help and other purposes in na-
tionality groups, and supported by a press in their own languages. As most foreigners 
did not take up citizenship, the link-up to the political system was weakened, particu-
larly the passage to the electoral scenario. It is not that those immigrant groups lacked 
political or ideological interest, but that they couldn't transform it into votes. And it 
must also be said that being foreigners they must have felt to be in alien turf, and thus 
did not feel entided to opine too much about what should be done in it. 
70 The network structure of the neighbourhood, with its mixture of dwellings and small workplaces, has been 
emphasised by several studies about early development of a class consciousness. Thus, Victoria E. Bonnell, 
Roots of Rebellion,: Workers' Politics and Organization in Saint Petersburg and Moscow, 1900-1914 (Berkeley, 1983), who 
contrasts it with what happened in larger factories; and Mary Lynn McDougall, 'Consciousness and 
Community: The Workers of Lyon, 1830-1850,' Journal of Social History, vol. 12, no. 1 (Fall 1978), pp. 129-45, 
for whom coffee houses were important centres of political and union activism, an experience difficult to 
reproduce in large-scale enterprises. The latter, however, once organised, can become fiilcrums of union 
power, as in Sao Paulo, on the basis of a different type of social structure. 
In fact, foreigners, with or without citizenship, who for decades made up almost 
30 per cent of Argentina's total population, and much more among the urban bour-
geoisie and the working class, had a salient role in trade unionism, and also in 
political expressions, notably anarchism (it is enough to recall Errico Malatesta and 
Pietro Gori) or in the Socialist Party, which was created by four pre-existing groups, 
only one of which was Argentine. Though the subject is open to a wide polemic, I 
would say it is quite obvious that the fact that during several formative decades the 
urban working class (and also the bourgeoisie) were foreign born and lacked citizen-
ship had as a result the weakening of the political parties that could have represented 
them, that is, a social democracy with more solid bonds to the working class than the 
Socialist Party had, or a liberalism with deeper roots among the entrepreneurs than 
Bartolome Mitre's Liberal Party and it successors, or Lisandro de la Torre's 
Progressive Democrats could boast. 
Given the intensity of the debate, I may be allowed to restate the issue: it is not 
that the European immigrants lacked an interest in politics, which to the contrary, 
was expressed in the above-alluded creation of the Socialist Party, which is even 
commonplace in Argentine historiography. The many studies that document the 
political or ideological involvement of some immigrant groups (with or without 
nationality) throw light on their sympathies. But the conclusion is not that, therefore, 
nationality didn't matter, but on the contrary, that the political parties which might 
have been based on their preferences were condemned to marginality, being devoid 
of the vote of their natural electorate.71 Had it not been for the foreign condition of a 
large part of the potential voting population, the party scheme in Argentina would 
have been more like the Australian one, and there would have been less space for the 
mobilisational caudillista variety of radicalismo, headed by Hipolito Yrigoyen, which 
contrasts with the Chilean, French, Spanish and Italian homonymous parties.72 
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One of the bases of working class organisation was the high number of self-taught 
activists. One of them, the anarchist Humberto Correale, the naval painter and man 
of many trades born in a 'barrio de latas', whom we have already met in these pages, 
remembered how he had been thrown off balance when he met the 'men of ideas': 
The kitchen was very small, but look: Art, Sciences, Literature, Sociology, 
Trade Unionism, Theatre. Because in those days there was neither radio nor 
TV at the people's reach, the fact is that they hypnotised me. 
Later on Correale completed his studies, and during his free time he visited 
museums, and when he could he organised art exhibits in union locales. He argued 
that wood carvers, who made the ships' figureheads, were the first sculptors, and the 
same with the stonecutters.73 
Another militant of the same ilk was Moravio Batini, who on finishing primary 
school entered a metallurgical factory as an apprentice, with six hours of work. This 
gave him the opportunity to attend a technical school, but when he turned 18 he had to 
complete his eight hours and could not go on studying. In the factory he had a very 
special encounter, with a Swiss mechanic, who had nothing to do with unionism, but 
had great culture: 
That Swiss was a towering figure for me, he was very important in my life. He 
took me to museums, to the Teatro Colon, to see paintings, hear music. As I 
liked literature, he took me to meet Victoria Ocampo. I was 16, he 26. He was a 
skilled worker, I an apprentice. You can't comprehend how that man cared for 
me when he realised how I was. We spent whole days together. I got to learn Italian, 
German, and I started to study English at the British Embassy. He knew an 
incredible amount of literary works ... ; when we started talking there was no end 
to it. When I first met him I used to have lunch at home and I ran to the factory 
where he ate like most others. He had an extraordinary family. His father had 
been stationmaster in Switzerland. Can you imagine what it means to be 
stationmaster in Switzerland?74 
In the factory, which had some 80 employees, no more than 20 were organised, 
mostly those with socialist or communist ideas. The shop steward, if found out, was 
immediately dismissed. When Peronism arrived all that changed from top to bottom, 
but Moravio 'didn't like demagogy', even if his father, who had been affiliated to the 
Socialist Party, did join the movement. He still remembers that when it became nec-
essary by law to pay the aguinaldo (thirteenth salary) at the end of 1945, the owner, 
with tears in his eyes, told his workers he didn't have the money. He was told by 
them, who were usually so silent, that in that case they would come to work. Later on 
the shop steward, who was a communist and had been active for long, was isolated 
and once imprisoned. 
Moravio Batini says that he sympathised with the socialists, especially with people 
like Mario Bravo, 'a poet, a morocho, a negro', or Alfredo Palacios, who 'had an 
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73 Humberto Correale, interview PHO-FSR. 
74 Moravio Batini, interview PHO-FSR. 
extraordinary dialectic'. He remained loyal to his ideas, though critical of many anti-
peronists, who complained about social laws, some of which were already on the 
statutes but were not applied. 
Cipriano Reyes himself, not usually perceived as a man of culture but of action 
(maybe he was both), in fact valued literary learning, or so he wishes us to believe. In his 
memoirs he describes an anthological scene, when, like many others, he was roaming 
the roads of Buenos Aires province in search of work in the harvest. He was part of a 
veritable 'circuit of walkers', who also boarded freight trains as 'crotos'. Once, in 1923, 
when crossing a bridge together with a friend, he saw two other itinerant down-and-
outs were calling him. One of them was a 
a man in his fifties, with a full head of hair and a long grey beard, sipping mate sitting 
over his bundle of clothes ... After chatting for a while, the old man asked us 
whether we had some books to exchange. I told him I had. He impressed me as a 
man from another sphere despite his aspect ... I opened my knapsack and I was 
preparing to give him a book called 'Iras Santas', lent to me by the 'negro' Acevedo. 
Very good, he told me, a great Peruvian poet, the best rebel poet in Latin America, 
the great defender of his people and of the Indian race ... I was awe-struck looking 
at him. He took the book he carried with him and told me he would exchange it for 
mine. It had worn-out red covers, with golden letters saying 'War and Peace', by 
Leon Tolstoi. And he explained that he was the greatest Russian writer of all times, a 
precursor of Bolshevism, mystic and Christian .... He sat again and started writing 
the norms of the exchange.75 
Better-known auto-didacts, like printer Sebastian Marotta, woodworker turned 
journalist Jacinto Oddone, mason Rubens Iscaro, and others who wrote about the 
labour movement, are only the tip of an iceberg which existed in Argentina and is 
now quite melted. Maybe what has happened is a paradoxical result of the expansion 
of education, which has weakened the intellectual cadres of the working class. This 
fact has already been noted in the European or North American context, and the 
same has happened in Argentina, with the social and educational policies of Peron's 
presidency. In the old days, when the chances of completing a high school education 
were slim, many individuals with an intellectual orientation had no alternative to 
manual work, thus remaining within the working class, and from there tried to satisfy 
their curiosity in unorthodox ways. Under conditions which, despite the many crises, 
are more open, with ample access to secondary and even university schooling, that 
kind of people, even when unable to complete their training, do emerge from the 
ranks of manual labour and enter into those of white collar, technician, or even semi-
professional status. A new 'intellectual proletariat' is thus formed, living under harsh 
conditions, but with a way of life removed from that of manual workers and trade 
unions. If at all, the modern equivalent of those self-taught militants can be found 
among some middle class unions, like the Asociacion de Trabajadores del Estado 
(ATE) — which not by chance has a very radicalised leadership — or the healdi 
workers, and of course teachers. For these people, when economic conditions make it 
difficult for them to get an acceptable job, the alternative of manual work is not really 
present, among other reasons because the training they have had does not prepare 
Cipriano Reyes, To hice el 17 de octubre: memorias (Buenos Aires, 1973). 
them for it. The result is the increasingly pragmatic orientation of most trade unions, 
and the prevalence of leftist phenomena at middle class levels. 
None of this means that it is impossible today to have a left-leaning working-
class movement. The cases of Chile, Uruguay and Brazil testify to this fact. But one 
of the transmission belts operating in the past has ceased to function. During the 
period studied in these pages this scenario was in full change. In addition, the ex-
panded occupational prospects opened up by war-induced prosperity and full 
employment contributed to the depletion of the working class activist ranks, as 
many talented members ascended the social pyramid. In many cases harassment by 
employers and police forced them to seek jobs in small shops or as self-employed, or 
with the help of some members of the family, thus losing contact with the bulk of 
union members, even if they remained active in their political party. 
What happened when a union militant was offered the chance to rise to a posi-
tion of higher responsibility? A case in point is that of Carlos Cesana, a mason in 
the Buenos Aires municipality, who had started as an unskilled labourer, a football 
enthusiast who was also active in the sports committee of the local Union de 
Obreros Municipales, and occasionally attended national congresses and of course 
mass meetings and assemblies, even though he never reached the Comision 
Directiva level. Suddenly, one day he was promoted to the rank of supervisor 
('subcapataz'), a job he gladly accepted, but which caused him no end of troubles 
with four youths 'full of vices and foibles', who certainly did not like heavy work, 
while he had no problem with four older men, who knew how to differentiate 
union militancy from work shirking. Given the protest of the four difficult youths, 
which the rival union (Federation de Obreros Municipales) took up, Cesana pub-
lished a letter in the journal of his organisation, titled 'A Villainous Accusation'. 
He said, referring to the episode: 
Tired of the justified complaints of the old fellows, and feeling it was impossible to 
make the others understand their obligations and the respect the old ones merited, I 
decided to abandon my post and asked the head foreman for a shovel, telling him I 
was incapable of dealing with the group under my supervision. He didn't accept my 
resignation, and I explained to his superior what was the matter. He proposed to me 
to change those four youngsters, I accepted and thus returned to my job. Is that 
being an informer? 
Cesana then adds that among the four 'one was an active legionary, who com-
manded the lot, and who ... acted under the inspiration of a certain colonel of the 
barrio of Flores.76 The legion to which he refers was of course one of the many existing 
at the time, of a highly right-wing nationalist hue, a fact that throws some light on the 
recruiting grounds of those organisations. 
A more visible case was that of Juan Armendares, a high-profile socialist leader of the 
textile union, elected its general secretary in 1938, where he lasted for one year (he was 
replaced by a communist, Jorge Michellon). Armendares was offered the following year 
the post of foreman, in a different enterprise. He decided to accept the deal, which meant 
his withdrawal from the union cadres, and possibly also a diminution of his party in-
volvement. In 1940 he signed, in representation of his new employers, an agreement with 
76 El Obrero Municipal (OMun) 16 Jan. and 1 April 1939; and El Municipal, 1 April 1939. 
the union, a fact pointed out by his rivals. As for Michellon, being unable to retain a job in 
his trade, he had been forced to become a commission agent, until he was elected general 
secretary, with a salary paid by the union (and by the Communist Party).77 
3. The transmutation of lead into gold 
Could it be possible to transform one model into the other, for example, the more 
primitive mobilisational caudillismo into associationism? Or maybe into something in 
between, like Leninism, or Bakunin's imagined and never-built model forcing the 
lumpen into a revolutionary outcome? The anarchist theoretician was one of the first to 
explore how a populist movement could become something else. During the Franco-
Prussian war, in 1870, he took a step in that direction, considering that the majority of 
the French people still supported the defunct emperor. Revolutionaries, in his view, 
rather than opposing the war, should support the enthusiasts of Louis Bonaparte, using 
banners the people could understand, channelling them into a socialist mould. The 
entrismo into more mass popular movements (populist or social democratic, even 
communist) of some Trotskyite and other leftist groups was practised in Argentina, once 
Peronism had proved its capacity to lead the masses on several occasions. One of them 
was adopted by the Partido Socialista de la Revolution Nacional (PSRN), split from the 
Socialist Party (SP) in 1953, and the latest that of the Montoneros, many of whom were 
far from being run-of-the-mill Peronists. 
The evolution of populism to the left, not only due to entrismo from external forces, 
but also through internal mutations, has been rampant in Latin America, notably in 
Brazil, where varguismo ended up posing a revolutionary threat to the system, under 
Joao Goulart (1963-64). The same happened with the second coming of Ibanez in 
association with a majority sector of the Socialist Party, and with Hugo Chavez in 
Venezuela in more recent times. 
Leftist entrismo into a popular authoritarian project had not been significant in 
Argentina prior to Peronism, mosdy because such a thing did not exist, or had only 
sprung up as isolated attempts. One of them was by General Juan B. Molina in 1936, 
when he planned a coup against the conservative regime of President Agustin P. 
Justo, in combination with some members of the left-leaning radical group FORfA, 
especially Diego Luis Molinari. When, during the early months after the 1943 coup, 
it became apparent that a new anti-oligarchic force was being created from official 
circles, the temptation was very great for leaders of the left to join that bandwagon 
and push it into a more leftist track. This strategy was explicidy condemned by the 
socialist and communist party structures, and by most of the top cadre of syndicalists. 
But among more pragmatic union leaders the desire to manage their own affairs was 
understandably greater. 
The concept of the autonomous working class organisation 
Studies of the working class movement have been, from their inception, very much 
linked to the concept of autonomous class organisation, in trade unions, co-operatives, 
cultural associations and political parties. Participation by some individuals from 
other social origins was not ruled out, but the central concern was the organisation of 
77 Dora Genkin, interview PHO-FSR. 
the popular classes without help from the State, and much less from the Church or 
the armed forces. The main theoretical body in this area was that of Marxism, with 
its social democratic and Fabian epigoni, for all of whom an autonomous organisa-
tion worthy of its name required leaders emerging from the grass roots, in principle in 
a democratic way, even if they often tended to remain in office for long periods, given 
the advantages they had over their internal rivals, who were usually more to the left.78 
One of the weapons at the disposal of the organisation is the strike, including mass pro-
tests and demonstrations, but in general there is a strong mistrust of sudden expressions 
of'spontaneous' popular wrath without the presence of a seasoned leadership. 
The initial moment of social democracy in Argentina is often considered to be the 
foundation of La Vanguardia and of the Socialist Party (1894-95), or if at all the 
publication of El Obrero, by the French Marxist German Ave Lallemant (1890), 
though there were some earlier expressions among the immigrant communities. El 
Obrero styled itself 'Defender of the interests of the proletarian class — Organ of the 
Federation Obrera'. The 'Federation Obrera' it intended to represent was the first 
of several failed attempts to organise a central organisation, following the widely at-
tended act in celebration of the First of May 1890, where many ideological and 
national groups were present. 
The main alternative to that approach was the anarchist belief that set much store 
on spontaneous struggle, stimulated by an activist elite but shunning complex stable 
structures. It even admitted the potentially revolutionary role of the lumpen sectors of 
the proletariat, like those Bakunin recommended in his famous letter to Nekaev. 
However, within anarchism there was also a more 'organisational' wing, which oper-
ated among trade unions, with a radical approach but not too different from the social 
democrat practice, except in its condemnation of party political action. 
Typically, an anarchist editor of the bakers' paper, in 1902, avowed that through 
'disappointments suffered' he had learned the mistake of ' the charlatans who say that 
the [floating] population of the taverns, the plazas, the market place, in other words 
the non-members, are as good or better for sustaining a struggle than the organised 
groups'.79 The idea of the espontaneistas, of course, was that the deracinated, often 
jobless, floating population (not necessarily lumpen proletariat, but near it) might join 
a great violent explosion, and not having anything to lose might be more useful than 
the rest. The problem, however, was how to give them leadership, and in that field 
history had in store alternatives scarcely imaginable at the time. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century the 
more visible militants were the anarchists, some of them quite violent, but there 
was also a more pragmatic group of unionists, without too many ideological 
concerns, or, like the socialists, mostly of a reformist practice even if using quite a 
radical phraseology. The pragmatic group often shunned incorporation into the 
national federations, thus starting the long tradition of the 'autonomous' unions. 
Some remained autonomous, not necessarily due to lack of ideological interest, but 
78 A classic analysis is that of Seymour Martin Lipset, in chapters four and 12 in Political Man: The 
Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, NY, 1960), 'Working Class Authoritarianism' and 'The Political 
Process in Trade Unions'. For a more in-depth study, see S.M. Lipset et al., Union Democracy: The Internal 
Politics of the International Typographical Union (Glencoe, IL, 1956). 
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to avoid splits among their ranks. The locomotive drivers' La Fraternidad, and the 
printers, were among the best-organised trades, and often independent from 
central organisations. 
Among the anarchists there was an intense debate between the 'organisers' and 
the 'anti-organisers'. The organisers among them, often called anarcho-syndicalists, 
evolved into more moderate positions, combining with sectors of the Socialist Party to 
form the revolutionary syndicalist tradition, to a large extent inspired by Georges Sorel. 
Particularly strong in France, they had important offshoots in Italy and South 
America. In Argentina its followers ended calling themselves simply syndicalist.80 
Their idea regarding the transformation of the capitalist system passed through the 
general strike, and the ensuing organisation of society by the trade unions, without 
any intervention by political parties or intellectuals. The distrust of intellectuals was 
particularly marked, and it appears often in the pages if their publications.81 This 
revolutionary syndicalist, or anarcho-syndicalist current, then, is a second organisa-
tional model, similar in many respects to the social democratic pattern, except for its 
rejection of parliamentary practice and of the role of intellectuals. 
A third model is that of Leninism. Under conditions quite typical of the periphery, 
and disillusioned about the transformative capacity of the working class 'left to itself, 
Lenin forged the concept of the revolutionary elite, capable of iron leadership of a well-
knit party. In this it contrasts with the other two models. Its success in Russia attracted 
many militants tired of the slow growth of a reformist programme. In more recent his-
torical experience, the Leninist model has evolved in a social democratic direction, 
given the impossibility of conducting a successful revolution. In the Argentina of the 
mid-twentieth century the communist-controlled unions were in practice quite similar 
to the social democratic ones, despite the difference in ideology. 
Of these three models, the revolutionary syndicalist — which in Argentina termed 
itself simply sindicalista — was the weakest, and in most parts of the world was being 
overshadowed by its rivals. In their resentment, some of its leaders searched for appar-
endy revolutionary heterodox courses, including fascism, especially in France and Italy. 
This fact, rather well known, has reflected on the prestige of this current of thought. In 
80 In Spanish the word lends itself to confusion, as sindicalismo also means trade unionism. In English 
the term syndicalism is clear enough, as it is not used to refer simply to trade unionism. The concept of 
anarcho-syndicalism is employed in different ways in the literature, due to the connections and frequent 
fusions between the organiser anarchists and the revolutionary syndicalists. In Argentina the Federacion 
Obrera Regional Argentina (FORA), up to 1915 radically anarchist, was taken over during its IX 
Congress by an alliance of moderate anarchists and syndicalists with some socialists, who rejected the 
earlier declaration of the V Congress of 1905, in favour of'anarchic communism'. Hard-line anarchists 
then split and formed the so-called 'FORA of the V Congress', while their moderate rival organisation 
was known as the FORA of the IX Congress. 
81 See the article by K. Rosene, a worker of the town of Bolivar, Buenos Aires (El Obrero Ferroviario, Feb. 
1917), and along the same lines, Silvano Prado, 'La subclase intelectual', where he accuses intellectuals of being 
the main exploiters of the workers' toil (LaAccion Socialista, 12 March 1910), and Julio Arraga, an intellectual 
sharing those opinions, in the same journal (11 Feb. and 1 March 1905). These attitudes contrasted with those 
of the moderate social democratic Italian leader Filippo Turati, who debated with a certain A. Graziadei, 
author of a book significantly titled Politico, dipartito e politico di classe. Turati stated the known social democratic 
belief that the working class, 'left to itself, was condemned to political ineffectiveness, and needed both 
intellectuals and a political party so as to involve other social actors. Of course his analysis, though having some 
points of contact with Lenin's (and particularly Kautsky's) came to different conclusions regarding how to 
establish a working partnership with the middle classes. See Critica Sociale (Italy) 16 Aug. 1905. 
fact, one of its main representatives, Hubert Lagardelle, editor of Sorel's Reflections on 
Violence, ended up as minister of labour under the Vichy regime and was jailed after the 
war. Another prominent leader, the Italian Edmondo Rossoni, joined II Duce, with a 
few others, and throughout his regime was the head of the official union structure.82 
However, these cases are far from representing a majority, or even an important sector 
of the Italian union movement. Of course socialism also gave some recruits, beginning 
with Mussolini himself, whose career in the Socialist Party was much more than a 
youthful episode. 
In Argentina it has been often stated, without sufficient data, that syndicalism was 
an important part of the early support for Peronism. This derives in part from the fact 
that one of the main leaders of what remained of their central federation (the Union 
Sindical Argentina), Luis Gay, joined the movement and was a founder of the Partido 
Laborista. If a list is made of the main leaders of this tendency, however, it can be seen 
that the majority opted for the opposite stance.83 
We can consider as forming part of the higher pre-Peronist syndicalist group the 
members of the Secretariat of the Union Sindical Argentina (USA), say from 1937 to 
1943, adding five leading figures who had to resign from its predecessor the C G T 
Catamarca because their unions remained autonomous: Andres Cabona, Sebastian 
Marotta, Jose Negri, Alejandro Silvetti and Antonio Tramonti, plus another one who 
remained in the rival CGT Independencia (dominated by socialists and communists), 
Luis Cerutti. Table 1 summarises the results. 
One might wonder what the grounds are for the thesis that there was a special 
relationship between syndicalism and Peronism, apart from the well-known figure of 
Luis Gay. It is true that the fact that this group was not linked to any party 
organisation might lead one to expect that they would be less controlled by a more 
ideologically sensitised structure. 
In fact, towards the end of the 1930s Antonio Tramonti, the main railway syndicalist, 
attempted to return to the control of his union (from which he had been displaced by 
socialists and communists) using his contacts with President Roberto Ortiz. This does 
not allow us to class him as being organically linked to the Antipersonalista Radical 
Party, but as being part of a mutual manipulation. It is also true that the syndicalists 
had been repeatedly accused by their enemies of fascist leanings, and that being at 
the helm of the newly created Confederation General del Trabajo (CGT) in 1930, 
they had to adopt a very cautious approach towards the military regime which came 
to power that year, and similarly so with the more constitutional but fraudulent one 
82 Leo Valiani, 'Le mouvement syndical ouvrier italien entre le fascisme e l'antifascisme, 1929-1939,' 
International Institute for Social History, Mouvements ouvriers et depresidn economique de 1929 d 1939 (Assen, 
1966), pp. 282-301, lists a dozen or so journalists and union leaders who passed through a similar 
evolution, among them Michele Bianchi, Agostino Lanzillo, Angelo O. Olivetti and Sergio Panunzio (p. 
284). See also Claudio Schwarzenberg, II sindacalismo fascista: problemi di storia (Milano, 1972); D.D. 
Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition and Italian fascism (Chapel Hill, 1979); Zeev Sternhell, Mario Sznajder 
and Maia Asheri, El nacimiento de la ideologia fascista (Madrid, 1994); and Frederick F. Ridley, Revolutionary 
Syndicalism in France: The Direct Action of its Time (Cambridge, 1970). 
83 See Laura Kalmanowiecki, 'La Union Sindical Argentina: de la revolucion prometida a la incorporation 
al sistema politico', in Torcuato S. Di Telia (ed.), Sindicatos como bs de antes..., pp. 117-67. According to her 
data, of 64 first-line syndicalist leaders of the Union Sindical Argentina, including her predecessor the CGT 
Catamarca of 1936, 33 (52%) were hostile to the new Partido Laborista, while 20 (31%) supported it, and there 
are no data for the remaining 11(17%). 
of General Agustin P. Justo. This is quite different from having an ideological 
involvement. Again, after the 1943 coup Tramonti attempted a comeback, and he 
accepted being an advisor to the intervention of the Union Ferroviaria. But he 
miscalculated, and when Peron decided to replace the very reactionary military man 
in charge with his friend Domingo Mercante, Tramonti and his group were dumped. 
It is not clear what position Tramonti took afterwards, but given his prominence, if 
he had adhered to the new regime he would have had a high visibility. Anyway, I 
have put him with a question mark in the above table, to be on the sure side. 
Table 1. Top 'Syndicalist Leadership Prior to die 1943 Coup, from 1937*" 
Aguilar, Antonio Maritime (FOM) Syndicalist No 
Biondi, Atilio Ship Repairers Syndicalist No 
Gabona, Andres Mimbrero, then State 
Employees 
Syndicalist No 
Cazzullo, Pedro Painters, La Plata Syndicalist No 
Gerutti, Luis Union Ferroviaria Pragmatic syndicalist Yes (employee of Labour 
Ministry from 1944) 
Constantejulio Painters, La Plata Possibly syndicalist ? 
Gay, Luis Telephone Workers Syndicalista Yes, then rebel 
Lanza, Octavio Tobacco Workers Possibly syndicalist No? 
Marinelli, Fortunato Maritime (FOM) Syndicalist No 
Marotta, Sebastian Printers Syndicalist No 
Marquez, Roberto Tobacco Workers ? No 
Milessi, Pedro Municipal Workers Independent Left No 
Negri, Jose Union Ferroviaria Socialist, pro-syndicalist No 
Olivetta, Miguel Metallurgical Workers, 
La Plata 
Syndicalist Probably died before 1943 
Orozco, Modesto Telephone Workers ? Yes, then a rebel (with Gay) 
Petrucelli, Pedro Pasteboard Makers Independent Left No 
Silvetti, Alejandro Cabinet Makers, then 
State Employees. 
Syndicalist No 
Tramonti, Antonio Union Ferroviaria Pragmatic syndicalist ? 
Varela, Enrique Tobacco Workers Socialist, pro-syndicalist No 
Total top 'syndicalist' leadership (less one deceased) 18 
Clearly anti-Peronist 12 (67%) 
Very probably anti-Peronist 1 (6%) 
Peronist 3(17%) 
No information 2(11 %) 
Regarding the communist leaders, the vast majority retained their convictions. This is 
a result of their strong ideological commitment, that is, they were a highly self-
84 CGTCat, 22 May 1937, US, 3 June 1937, US, 5 July 1939, US, 21 Feb. 1941, US, 25 March and 30 
April 1943. For other data that help locate the attitudes of some of these people see US, 25 April 1945, 21 Jan 
and 1 April 1946, 15Jan 1947; and 24 to 27 April 1947. Many other references to individuals, collected in the 
prosopography on which this work is based, cannot be listed here. 
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selected group, for whom the party was not only a control structure but also a pro-
vider of various types of support in hard times. They were a very important part of 
the pre-Peronist union leadership, not simply an extremist minority as they have 
become in later years. They did not have an important presence in the polls, mostly 
because they were barred from them, though probably it would not have been very 
high had they been free to field candidates. The areas where they were more 
influential (building, meat packing, textile and metallurgical workers) were very sig-
nificant, and expanding. Their presence was even greater in Chile and Uruguay, 
where they overshadowed the social democrats. 
This Leninist model is now in decline, for obvious reasons, but during the period 
under consideration it was very healthy. At times even the extent of their influence 
has been exaggerated by researchers, partly as an effect of ideological considerations. 
In this, as in other aspects, there is a convergence between the view from the right, 
which sees a communist hiding behind any shadow, and that from the left, which 
tends to minimise the solidity of the social democratic organisations. Peron was cer-
tainly one of the main exponents of the theory about the 'communist threat', 
whether he believed it or not. It is impossible to know how far communist influence 
would have gone in a country without Peronism. I do not believe there were condi-
tions for its enrolling a majority of the working class, though much depended on what 
would happen after the end of the war, when a crisis of unemployment was 
foreseeable, accompanied by revolutionary agitations, as had happened after the First 
World War, with an impact also in Argentina with the Semana Tragica (1919) and 
the events of the Patagonia (1921-22). 
The 'revisionist' interpretations regarding the supposedly autonomous convergence of 
the working class leadership with Peronism are mostly based on those of a socialist or 
pragmatic orientation in the largest union, the Union Ferroviaria. In this union the theory 
has more evidence in its favour, though one must put the facts into context. First of all, if 
one is considering the railway workers, it is essential to include also the other union oper-
ating in that field, the Fraternidad, representing the highly qualified engine drivers and 
their assistants, which remained staunchly anti-Peronist, and resisted repeated attempts by 
the new government to control it. On the other hand, the skilled unions — printers, 
shoemakers, cabinet-makers, carpenters, painters, plumbers — where there was a high 
socialist presence, also maintained a strong resistance to the new mass movement. And 
the same was true of the leadership of the increasingly important Union Obrera Textil, 
where there was an equilibrium between socialists and communists, and where the great 
majority of members of both currents remained in opposition.85 A detailed analysis of 
each trade will be undertaken below. 
But let us now examine the attitudes of what we might call, following Juan Carlos 
Torre, the 'Vieja Guardia' (Old Guard) of the CGT. One way of defining this is to 
include all members of the Secretariat between 1937 and 1943, considering for that last 
year the two sections into which it was split. Table 2 summarises the information. 
85 For the textile industry I have published a first provisional report in 'La Union Obrera Textil,' 
Desarrollo Econdmico, vol. 33, no. 129 (April-June 1993), pp. 109-36, which shows that of the pre-1943 
leadership, either socialist or communist, practically nobody adhered to Peronism. 
Table 2. T o p Leadership of the CGT Prior to the 1943 Coup, from 1937 »e 
Almarza, Camilo Union Ferroviaria Socialist No 
Argana,Jose Commerce (CGEC) Socialist Yes 
Cianciardo, Mariano Fraternidad Socialist Died in 1942 
Criado, Lazaro Fraternidad Socialist No 
Domenech,Jose Union Ferroviaria Socialist No " 
Gonzalez, Jose Maria Commerce (CGEC) Socialist Yes 
Gonzalez,Julio S. Union Ferroviaria Socialist p 
Perez, Isaac Tramways No? 
Perez Leiros, Francisco Municipal Workers Socialist No 
Pistarini, Pedro Fraternidad Socialist I No 
Porto, Enrique Tramways Socialist No 
Rubio, Valentin Tramways Socialist Yes 
Sartorio,Jose Fraternidad Socialist No? 
Total top leadership of CGT prior to 1943 (less one deceased) 12 
Clearly anti-Peronist 6 (50%) 
Very probably anti-Peronist 2 (17%) 
Peronist 3 (25%) 
No information 1 (8%) 
Of course several front-line leaders are left off this list, like Angel Borlenghi, head of 
the commerce employees, and the guiding force behind the C G T no. 2 (anti-
Domenech) in 1943, even if he was not part of its Secretariat. Also missing are the 
printers Renee Stordeur and Riego Ribas; and the head of the shoemakers, Alfredo 
Fidanza, not to speak of the building trades' Pedro Chiarante or the meatpackers' 
Jose Peter, both communists. Borlenghi played a very prominent role in the forma-
tion of the Peronist movement, and was, for virtually all General Peron's first two 
periods in office, his minister of the interior. According to Hipolito Paz's Memoirs 
Peron feared him, but he had to spare him, despite his hostility to the Catholic 
Church.87 Borlenghi's prominence among those of a socialist origin is equivalent to 
that of Luis Gay among the syndicalists, but equally unrepresentative. Of the others 
mentioned all retained an anti-Peronist commitment. 
If we wish to throw a wider net, and incorporate into the Vieja Guardia of the C G T 
all members of its Administrative Commissions (that is, including the vocales), the image 
is somewhat more favourable to Peronism, though it does not compensate the figures in 
the previous table. On the other hand, given the lesser notoriety of these people, there 
are more cases without information. The list is as in Table 3 below. 
86 CGT of 6, 13, 20, 27 Aug., 10 Sept. and 1 Oct. 1943; Noticias Grdficas from 10 March to 19 March 
1943; Guy Bourde, La classe ouvriire argentine, 1929-1969, 3 vols. (Paris, 1987), vol. 3, pp. 1237-8. 
87 Hipolito Paz, Memorias: vida publicay privada de un argentino del siglo XX (Buenos Aires, 1999), p. 209. 
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Table 3. Intermediate Leadership of the CGT Prior to the 1943 Coup, from 1937 88 
Note: only the vocales are included so as not to repeat Table 2 
Andreani, Eduardo Union Ferroviaria Socialist No 
Borello, Antonio Fraternidad Socialist No 
Borlenghi, Angel Commerce (CGEC) Socialist Yes 
Brugnerotto,Juan Union Ferroviaria SocialistP/Radical? Yes 
Gordes, Enrique Union Ferroviaria Radical?/Socialist? p 
Chiaranu, Pedro Building Trades 
(FONC) 
Communist No 
D'Almeida, Domingo Union Ferroviaria ? Yes 
Damigella, Salvador Building Trades 
(FONC) 
Communist? No? 
De Gesare, Vicente Commerce (CGEC) Socialist Yes 
Descalzo, Luis Fraternidad Communist? No? 
Fiori, Luis Building Trades 
(FONC) 
Communist No 
Garini, Carlos Union Ferroviaria p p 
Gonzalez, Ricardo Municipal Workers Socialist? No 
Larken, Emilio Union Ferroviaria p 
Monzalvo, Luis Union Ferroviaria p Yes 
Perez Martinez, Carlos Commerce (CGEC) p Yes 
Rosendo, Ignacio Union Ferroviaria Socialist Yes 
Royo, Jose Commerce (CGEC. Communist? p 
Santos, Antonio p Communist No? 
Seijas, Ramon Tramways Socialist Yes? (contradictory 
information) 
Sietti, Roque (o Sissti) Union Ferroviaria Socialist ? 
Taccone, Antonio Union Ferroviaria p Yes 
Tadioli, Pedro Building Trades 
(FONC) 
Communist No 
Tesorieri,Jose State Employees 
(ATE) 
PSt Yes 
Testa, Roberto Union Ferroviaria Socialist No 
UgazioJuanB. Municipal Workers Socialist Yes 
Zanetti, Argentino Union Ferroviaria Socialist p 
Total intermediate leadership of C G T prior to 1943 27 
Clearly anti-Peronist 7 (26%) 
Very probably anti-Peronist 3 (11%) 
Clearly Peronist 10(37%) 
Very probably Peronist 1 (4%) 
No information 6 (22%) 
Same sources as for table 2. 
^ I f t i j i t o ^ ; : f Ideology be fore 1943 Invo lvement in f • f m 
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The lack of information makes it more difficult to interpret this table, though it must 
be said that they are more likely to have been cast aside and sunk into anonymity 
than the opposite. 
Anyway, if one is to examine the subject 'from the other side', that is, if we take 
the leadership of the C G T of 1948, clearly of a Peronist faith, it is worth seeing how 
many had played a role in the CGT's earlier leadership, not only in the Comision 
Administrativa (CA), but also in the wider Comite Central Confederal (CCC), with 
45 members. Table 4 illustrates the background of these leaders, adding, in some 
cases, relevant information on activity in the working class movement, even if not in 
the CA or the CCC. 
Table 4. Leadership of the Peronist CGT of1948, According to Previous Activity89 
Alonso,Jose no Socialist 
Antelo, Domingo no p 
Arias,Jesus no p 
Borlenghi, Emilio no (brother of Angel) 
Ciurlande, Antonio no p 
Correa, Antonio no p 
Diskin, David yes (active in Commerce) Socialist 
Espejo,Jose no Socialist 
Fernandez, Graciano no p 
Ferrari, Antonio no p 
Gimenez, Juan no p 
Gosis, Victor no p 
Griol l i jose no p 
Lopez, Geferino no (but active in local Union Ferroviaria) Socialist 
Naveda, Romualdo no p 
Perazzolo, JuanJ yes jand active in local Union Ferroviaria) UCR? 
Protti, Alejandro no Syndicalist 
Rubio, Valentin i no (but active in Tramways Union) Socialist 
Salvo. Hilano no p 
Santin. Isaias no Independent Left 
Serra. Rodolfo no p 
Soto, Florencio no (but active in local Union Ferroviaria) Socialist? 
Tesorieri,Jose yes (active in state employees union) Socialist 
Ugazio, Juan yes ^active in municipal workers) Socialist 
Valerga, Antonio no (but active in clothing union| Socialist 
This indicates a widespread renewal of personnel, even though the list includes some 
previously playing a middle-level role. Admittedly, some important leaders from the 
pre-Peronist period had taken up positions in government, and thus could not be 
present in the CGT, like Angel Borlenghi, minister of the interior, or Silverio 
Pontieri, member of the Lower House of the National Congress. On the other hand, 
it is understandable that some of those who had some previous experience would 
89 Clarln, 3 Dec. 1947. 
Name Position in the Comision Administrativa (CA) Ideology prior 
or the Comite Central Confederal (CCC) to 1943 
between 1937 and 1943 j; 
have been included in the new leadership, even if they were not highly representative 
of the pre-existing cadres. 
Another type of analysis often made is that of the composition of the CGC of the 
GGT at the famous meeting of 16 October 1945, when it was decided to hold the 
general strike in support of Peron's return from detention (against the opinion of a lot 
of Union Ferroviaria delegates). But that CGG did not represent adequately the ex-
isting union leadership, as the CGT had been repeatedly purged and split. We shall 
return later to this subject. 
The organisational models of pragmatic unionism and verticalismo 
To grasp the nature of the Argentine labour movement it is necessary to comple-
ment the description of the three Marxist-inspired models (social democratic, 
anarcho-syndicalist and Leninist) with two others of a different hue: pragmatic 
bread and butter unionism, North American style, and verticalismo, dominant where 
state-generated populism had an important impact, as in Brazil and Argentina, and 
also, in a different context, Mexico.90 
The North American model is not far removed from the social democratic one, 
from which, however, it differs due to the lesser ideological involvement of its leaders 
and most of its rank and file. Furthermore, the absence of significant socialist parties 
reinforces pragmatism. This does not mean that those unions shun politics, and in 
this they also differ from traditional European syndicalism. The connections between 
the great North American union federations and the Democratic Party are very close, 
including explicit endorsement of candidates and financial support. In some of the 
more industrialised states of the north, such as Michigan, the connection resembled 
that existing in Great Britain.91 
In the United States, at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
the presence of the Left in the labour front was still quite significant. Why it dimin-
ished almost to vanishing point is a complex problem, beyond the reaches of this 
paper. However, a couple of factors may be mentioned. One of them is the preva-
lence of social mobility, and the opportunities created by the so-called 'frontier'. 
Though there has been much myth-making about the presumed egalitarianism of 
those days, this does not justify throwing away the proverbial baby with the 
bathwater. The other factor was ethnic heterogeneity, first among the various 
European immigrants and then with the Afro-American and Hispanic diaspora, all of 
90 Leoncio Martins Rodrigues et al., Nuevas tendencias en el sindkalismo: Argentina-Brasil (Buenos Aires, 1992); 
yVngela de Castro Gomes et al., Estado, corporatwismoy accidn social en Brasil, Argentinay Uruguay (Buenos Aires, 
1992); Judit L. Kohan et al., Experiencias sindicales recientes: Argentina, Brasil (Buenos Aires, 1993); Maria del 
Carmen Arnaiz (ed.), Movimientos sociales en la Argentina, Brasily Chile, 1880-1930 (Buenos Aires, 1995). 
91 Arthur Kornhauser, William Sheppard and Albert Mayer, When Labor Votes: A Study of Auto Workers 
(New York, 1956); J.D. Greenstone, Labor in American Politics (New York, 1969); D. Judd, The Politics of 
American Cities: Private Power and Public Policy, 3rd ed. (Boston, 1988). On the more recent decline in the 
number of members in North American trade unions, as a result mainly of de-industrialisation, 
Seymour M. Lipset (ed.), Unions in Transition (San Francisco, 1986). The proportion of affiliated workers 
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Case of the American Democratic Party,' in her edited book, Labor Parties in Postindustrial Societies (New 
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which have stimulated xenophobia and racism of older working class groups and 
their consequent susceptibility to appeals from the Right.92 
It is significant that in Australia and New Zealand, with social structures akin to 
that of the United States, but without its ethnic heterogeneity (up until the Second 
World War), a social democratic union movement has remained dominant, with a 
solid connection to the Labour Party. As for Canada, ethnic homogeneity is much 
higher there than in the United States, except for the difference between Anglo- and 
Francophones, which is more regional than class-based. The result has also been the 
early presence of a socialist movement (the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, 
CCF, since 1961 the New Democratic Party), with close links to the unions, even if 
less electoral presence than in Australia. Quebec's regionalist movement, which 
adopts quite an anti-status quo stance with popular nationalist overtones, attracts 
votes which would otherwise go to the New Democrats, thus weakening the latter's 
connection to the working class.93 
Finally, to complete this enumeration, the verticalista model. To start with the 
more obvious, there is the classical Brazilian unionism of the pelegos, totally dominated 
by the government of the day, even if capable — through a form of local clientelism 
— of channelling support to Getulio Vargas, and then to his more leftist heir, Joao 
Goulart.94 This scheme was based on extended apathy among the working class, 
pardy due to the recent rural origins of its vast majority, coming from very backward, 
almost feudal zones of the hinterland. It must also be said that during most of the 
period of formation of that kind of union the regime was dictatorial (1937-45), 
though they were later sustained under more democratic arrangements. However, 
the colossal industrial growth of the Sao Paulo region, together with the strength of 
Brazil's conservative parties, which rob clients to populism, has facilitated the forma-
tion of a new, autonomous and leftist unionism, the Central Unica de Trabalhadores 
(CUT) and Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), both clearly variants of the social 
democratic organisational pattern. 
In the Argentine case, for decades a caudillista, bureaucratised leadership pattern 
has survived, ready to compromise with the powers that be, but at the same time ca-
pable of an effective defence of the interests of its members, and thus maintaining 
their support. There is a cultural compatibility between the traits of the leaders and of 
the majority of the rank and file, which it is necessary to explore in order to under-
stand the solidity of the bond that unites them. It could be argued that the transition 
from a social democratic pattern of organisation to a more pragmatic one (of the 
92 See Charles Leinenweber, Immigration and the Decline of Internationalism in the American Working Class Movement, 
1864-1919, PhD dissertation (Berkeley, 1968); Thomas Byrne Edsall with Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The 
Impact of Race, Rights and Taxes on American Politics (New York, 1991) about the breakdown of the Democratic 
Party in the south of the United States, where it took the black vote but lost that of the white upper classes. See 
J.R. Petrocik, Party Coalitions: Realignments and the Decline of the New Deal Party System (Chicago, 1981) and Frances 
Fox Piven, 'Structural Constraints'. 
93 Gordon Greenwood (ed.), Australia: A Social and Political History (Sydney, 1955); Tim Duncan and 
John Fogarty, Australia and Argentina in Parallel Paths (Carlton, 1984); Keith Sinclair, A History of New 
Zealand (London, 1980); W.J.C. Cherwinski and Gregory S. Kealy, Lectures in Canadian Labour and 
Working-Class History (St John's, Terranova, 1985); Donald Creighton, Canada's First Century, 1867-1967 
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94 Kenneth Erikson, The Brazilian Corporative State and Working Class Politics (Berkeley, 1977). 
North American or Argentine variety) tends to accompany industrial development, 
or the rapid increase of membership, leaving behind the more archaic forms of la-
bour militancy. In the United States the 1930s witnessed a great increase in union 
affiliation, which extended to areas previously beyond the reach of activists because of 
governmental and employer repression, such as steel or automobile production. The 
change was partly due to New Deal policies, and resulted in a change from the 
American Federation of Labour skilled-worker practices to the more industry-wide 
policies of the Congress of Industrial Organisations, which happened to be more to 
the left, but at the same time closer to government circles. This leftist orientation did 
not last, and thus did not result in a revival of the social democratic model, nor did it 
generate a populist movement, but joined a reformist popular party, which, even if 
allied to labour, was not capable of controlling it, as occurred with varguismo or 
Peronism.95 
In France too there was a transformation in the dominant ideology of the labour 
movement after the First World War, from syndicalism, or the Socialist Party, to 
communism, all accompanied by an increase in membership, which must be consid-
ered to a large extent cause, and not consequence, of the ideological renewal.96 In 
Italy also there was a huge expansion in affiliation within the leftist Confederazione 
Generale del Lavoro, which grew from 250,000 members in 1918 to 2,200,000 in 
1921, paralleling a great increase in the vote for the Socialist Party, even if one may 
wonder as to the solidity of convictions of these droves of newcomers.97 As for 
Germany, after the First World War and the failed social revolution of 1918 the nu-
merical strength of unions jumped from less than a million and a half to double that 
the same year, and to the unbelievable figure of seven million by 1919. This did not 
help at all the task of the moderate leadership of the Social Democrats, confronted 
with a mass — not necessarily of recent rural migrants — with little, if any previous 
organisational experience. In this case, as in the others mentioned above, the new 
entrants tended towards the left, or were incorporated by the leaders of that ten-
dency, which easily appealed to their war-engendered resentments.98 
95 I do not consider the North American Democratic Party as 'populist' because it does not have a 
charismatic and 'vertical' leadership, and is based to a large extent on autonomously organised trade 
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97 A. James Gregor, Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship (Princeton, 1979), p. 173. The 
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98 Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (White Plains, NY, 1978), 
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To proceed now with the thesis about the similarities between the North 
American and the Argentine processes, the common cause might be sought in the 
similarities between the social structures of those two countries, when Argentina was 
a veritable South American Australia. In both countries, the passage from a social 
democratic to a pragmatic pattern might have been the result of modernisation, and 
of the incorporation of new masses of previously marginalised sectors, like those who 
formed the basis of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), or of justicialismo. 
The Argentine variant of populism, then, would be closer to the North American 
Democratic Party, contrasting with the situation in Brazil, at that time a much less 
developed country. 
However, in many respects the social contexts in the USA and Argentina were far 
from being so akin at the time. First of all, Roosevelt's New Deal did not apply any 
special repression to the working class movement or the leftist parties, contrary to 
what occurred in Argentina during Peron's ascent to power from 1943 to 1945. And 
the end result was not a verticalista, but an autonomous, pragmatic unionism. 
Admittedly, one might wonder how different are those two cases of pragmatism, 
the one that I have called 'American style', and the Argentine verticalismo. There are 
some points of contact, to begin with the fact that both were variants of pragmatism. 
In some cases, such as that of the North American Teamsters, the patterns seem to 
converge. However, Jimmy Hoffa did not owe his situation to intervention by the 
state, but to conditions emerging in his trade. Besides, his case is not typical. 
What is found in the United States' case is a solid bureaucratisation, permanence 
of officials in their highly remunerated posts, and low rank and file participation. But 
this is part of really existing democracy, as much in trade unionism as in other 
spheres of activity. Some of those traits also exist in the social democratic model, and 
in Great Britain it is often the case that the members of the Executive Council, in-
cluding the general secretary, are elected without any limit of time unless a majority 
demands their withdrawal. In this sense, the social democratic model, as much as the 
two pragmatic ones, are based to a large extent on membership apathy coupled with 
consensus." But in the verticalista variety there is a much greater concentration of 
authority and a lack of transparency in its operations, which justify putting it in a 
different category. 
But let us now examine in greater detail how the various sectors of the existing 
working class leadership reacted to the challenge coming from the military regime 
established in 1943, and to Peron's return to power upon a wave of popular mobili-
sation, in October 1945, after being ousted during a few days by his military 
colleagues. 
The trade union leadership at the crossroads of October 1945 
At the time of the 1943 military coup the trade union movement was, of course, fully 
accustomed to negotiating, not only with the employers, but with the government 
and to seeking friends in official spheres. The anarcho-syndicalist attitude, dominant 
99 See Hugh Clegg et al., Trade Union Officers: A Study of Full Time Officers, Branch Secretaries, and Shop 
Stewards in British Trade Unions (Cambridge, MA, 1961); David Edelstein and Malcolm Warner, 
Comparative Union Democracy: Organization and Opposition in British and American Unions (London, 1975). 
at the beginning of the century, of refusing to deal with the authorities, and rejecting 
'apparently' favourable legislation, had been long abandoned. From the other side, that 
is, from the ruling circles, conservative or radical, various tactics had also been explored 
to obtain support from the labour movement, or to cultivate some reliable allies among 
them. This was in the spirit of the times, independent of the ideologies. It is hardly sur-
prising, then, that even fraudulent office holders, like Manuel Fresco in the province of 
Buenos Aires, tried their hand at social policies, and it is a mistake to consider them a 
precedent of Peronism. 
The surprise some researchers have shown when documenting these facts may be 
due to the stereotype of the regimes of the 'decada infame' as being hopelessly reac-
tionary, which was far from being the case. A more recent historiography has revised 
those views, even risking going over to the other extreme. The change of perspective 
has occurred not only in what concerns labour policies, but also in the economic 
field, including the famous Roca-Runciman Agreement (1933) and the Planning 
Boards (Juntas) active in several productive spheres. And it is not by chance that those 
policies were implemented by people with a socialist past, like Federico Pinedo, 
Antonio De Tomaso and Raul Prebisch. 
Within the conservative ruling groups there was a faction inspired by fascism, which 
of course did not have much confidence in democracy, but in other areas was far from 
being 'more to the right' than the conservative-liberal mainstream. In other words, 
fascism is more a current of the centre than of the right, in social matters, as has been 
pointed out by Lipset and other authors.100 For Peron and many of his early collabora-
tors fascism was, no doubt, an important model, but the innovation Peron introduced 
into his way of thinking was Copernican. It is necessary also to take into account the 
many sources of his mental outlook — from social Christian to what we would call now 
Third World nationalism and anti-imperialism — but the central aspect of his radical 
innovation was the way that he incorporated the masses into a mobilisational scheme, 
in a much more profound way than had Yrigoyen a generation earlier. 
On the trade union side also the strategies regarding how to tackle the initiatives 
coming from government — democratic, fraudulent or dictatorial — were very 
pragmatic. As is well known, the leaders of the recently created CGT, mostly syndi-
calists in 1930, had to treat the Uriburu regime installed that same year with a great 
deal of caution — to the extent of publishing some favourable declarations — to avoid 
greater evils, like the execution of anarchist activists. Years later, when the CGT had 
passed under socialist and communist control, a delegation was sent to meet Manuel 
Fresco, on the occasion of the first anniversary of his inauguration, congratulating him 
on his promises to implement a social policy. The delegation included the communist 
masons Pedro Chiarante and Guido Fioravanti, the latter soon to be deported to 
100 Lipset, in his Political Man, has a chapter (5) provocatively titled '"Fascism": Left, Right and Centre'. 
That title, hardly appropriate in an article originally written for a university journal addressed to a wide 
public, is based on a widely documented analysis of the variants of what might be better called 
authoritarianism rather than fascism, because in its leftist form it includes communism as well as Peronism. 
Nazism he locates in the centre, due to the kind of class support it got, and to its propaganda being 
partly aimed against some upper class groups. On the right there would be such phenomena as 
Francoism and Salazarismo. Calling communism 'leftist fascism' is more a play on words than anything 
else, and so must be considered its application to Peronism. 
Italy.101 That same confederation did not consider this action incompatible with its sup-
port of a Popular Front, but rather the contrary. 
The ideological mixture to be found in Barcelo's and Fresco's entourage was really 
a precursor of some things to come, but it did not include a truly mobilisational 
formula, and that is a fundamental difference. The nationalist Bandera Argentina (20 
February 1937), for example, praised Fresco for receiving the delegation from the 
CGT, saying that the governor represented 4 a syndicalist nationalism, hierarchical and 
totalitarian', ready to establish compulsory union membership. The concept of social 
justice was very much in vogue, and it was used by a wide gamut of people, from the 
socialist Francisco Perez Leiros to the pro-Nazi Cabildo, in an article (2 October 1941) 
entided 'Hider's Word', where the German leader was extolled because he 'signifies, in 
the field of social justice, an identity of the aims of national socialism and of fascism, in 
line with the now universally accepted doctrine of the New Order'. 
The policies of the CGT and individual unions could not help from oscillating 
somewhat, in a more pragmatic manner than the party leaders with whom they were 
associated. In the case of the visit to Governor Fresco, their aim was to obtain favour-
able conditions for the textile conflict, mosdy centred in Greater Buenos Aires, in 
Avellaneda, Bernal and San Martin (Villa Lynch). 
The division of the CGT, started in the Congress held in December 1942 and fi-
nalised in the meeting of the Comite Central Confederal (CCC) of May 1943, brought 
face to face a group of labour leaders more closely linked to the political parties (socialist 
and communist) and those who preferred a more independent course of action, even if 
in alliance with those parties. Thus were born CGT nos. 1 and no. 2. The CGT no. 1 
was headed by Jose Domenech, the leading figure of the Union Ferroviaria, and by his 
close associate Camilo Almarza, with the support of a few other unions, but strong due 
to the large size of its main bulwark. The CGT no. 2 was headed by socialists Francisco 
Perez Leiros, of the Municipal Workers, and Angel Borlenghi, of the Commerce 
Employees, plus the communists and most other small unions. It may be said that the 
Union Ferroviaria — numerically the largest union, very centrally organised and 
spread all over the country — was quite advanced on its way from a social democratic 
to a 'North American pragmatic' model. However, most of its leaders remained affili-
ated to the leftist parties and currents, even if they maintained a distance from any party 
in particular, to avoid divisionism. 
The Union Ferroviaria is the main trade union on which the 'revisionist' theories 
about the autonomous role of labour's involvement with Peronism are based. In fact, 
data come nearer to supporting these theories than is the case with most other 
unions, especially in the artisan skilled and industrial or building fields. However, in 
considering the railway workers, the other union active among them should be con-
sidered, the highly significant (though less numerous) locomotive drivers' 
Fraternidad, whose leaders, both national and local, remained anti-Peronist almost to 
a man. Even in the Union Ferroviaria, two of its main chiefs, Jose Domenech, the 
president (also secretary general of the pre-division CGT and the CGT no. 1), and 
his close associate Camilo Almarza (assistant secretary of the CGT) retained a clearly 
oppositionist attitude. This attitude was not incompatible with various strategies 
101 See CGT 26 Feb. and 12 March 1937 with photograph; and CGT, 30 Jan., 18 Feb., 26 Feb., 19 
Feb. 1937. 
intended to support sectors of the military government, which seemed readier to 
come to an understanding with labour. The intewentor in the Union Ferroviaria and 
the Fraternidad, Capitan de Fragata Raul Puyol, had named as his secretary a very 
interesting character, Benito Agulleiro ('Comrade Benito' to his friends), who after a 
communist youth had seen the light of reason and become labour correspondent for 
the nationalist periodical Crisol. Agulleiro was also author of a book, published during 
the very same period, Tecnica de la infiltration comunista, by Editorial La Mazorca, in its 
Coleccion Anticomunista.102 
Peron, from his position in the newly created Secretaria de Trabajo y Prevision, 
towards the end of 1943, decided to change the policy of repression, and send as a 
new intewentor his friend Colonel Domingo Mercante. Mercante soon held new elec-
tions in both railway unions, in which most members of the old administrative bodies 
were re-elected, except the communists, barred from the polls, and Domenech 
himself, who preferred to remain aloof and return to his post as carpenter in a rail-
way repair shop in Rosario, probably so as not to legitimise the process. In this epi-
sode the classic competition between the old syndicalists, led by Antonio Tramonti, 
and Domenech's group, was re-enacted, as we have already seen. Tramonti was 
dismissed from his role as an advisor and soon disappeared from the scene, but one of 
his main collaborators, Luis Maria Rodriguez, remained in opposition to the regime, 
and probably also Tramonti remained aloof, though in his case I have been unable to 
get clearer information. 
Domenech, however, despite the low profile he adopted, participated in a meeting 
in Rosario in December 1943, to which railway workers invited Peron and thanked 
him for his role in the normalisation of the union. On that occasion Domenech called 
Peron 'el primer trabajador', a phrase that stuck, and was included in the Peronist 
songs, a fact some believe shows his collaboration with the regime. But this is not the 
case, as it is necessary to distinguish negotiation strategies, or even a word of praise, 
from more solid involvement. Most other socialist leaders of individual unions, when 
convoked to advise the newly created Secretaria de Trabajo y Prevision did not shun 
participation, hoping among other things to score some points against their disgraced 
communist rivals. The idea that a member of the military dictatorship (full of high-pro-
file fascist officials in educational and cultural areas) might become the leader of a 
popular movement couldn't even have crossed their minds. In fact, most retained an 
oppositional stance when things came to a head.103 
Regarding the rest of the Union Ferroviaria leaders, Domenech himself com-
plained that 'all of them became Peronist', which, however, is more an expression of 
resentment towards some of his friends who failed to support him than a true de-
scription of the facts. Thus, of 20 names of Union Ferroviaria leaders mentioned by 
Joel Horowitz in his study of several unions (excepting the salaried administrator 
102 CGT, 1 Nov. 1943. 
103 Among them Candido Gregorio and Lucio Bonilla of the textile workers, Alfredo Fidanza of the 
shoemakers, Jesus Fernandez of the Fraternidad locomotive drivers and (in another ideological field) Fortunato 
Marinelli of the sailors. Even the communists, among them textile worker Jorge Michellon and Jose Peter of 
the packinghouses, toyed with similar attitudes at various points. Others, like Angel Borlenghi, who at the 
beginning went along 'to see what was going on', were eventually involved in the movement. See the 
interviews with Lucio Bonilla, Jose Domenech, Camilo Almarza, Luis Maria Rodriguez, and Jesus Fernandez 
in the Oral History Programme of the Instituto Di Telia (PHO-ITDT). 
Rafael Kogan and the deceased Bernardo Becerra), it turns out that eight were 
clearly anti-Peronist, eight Peronist, plus three of the Tramonti group on whom there 
is less information, but who most probably did not get involved in the new 
movement.104 
Another way of analysing the events is to focus on all members of the Mesa Directiva 
of the Union Ferroviaria (I have data from 1934 to 1940), as shown in table 5. 
Table 5. M e m b e r s of the Mesa Directiva of the Union Ferroviaria, 
between 1934 and 1940"" 
Alvarez, Miguel Syndicalist? 1 ? 1 1 
Canzobre, Jose Socialist . J e s ? | 
Caruso, Paulo Socialist 
Corvi, Rinaldo ? I [ J ~" | 
Domenech, Jose Socialist no | 
Girola, Luis Socialist ! yes ' 
Gonzalez, Luis Socialist yes 
Lopez, Ceferino Socialist yes \ 
Luna, Telmo Socialist yes i 
Rodriguez, Luis M. Syndicalist no 
Spagnuolo, Pedro ? p 
Mirambell, Carlos Socialist? ! no 1 
Picallo, Higinio Socialist ! ? \ 
\ " i 
Melani, Antonio Socialist pro-syndicalist no | 
Total members of Mesas Directivas, Union Ferroviaria 1934—40 14 
Clearly anti-Peronist 4 (29%) 
Clearly Peronist 4 (29%) 
Possibly Peronist 1 (7%) 
No information 5 (36%) 
Here too there is an equilibrium, as in Horowitz's data (which were collected with a 
different criterion). Now, if we throw a wider net, to include also the rest of the mem-
bers of the Comision Administrativa (the so-called vocales), the results are reported in 
Table 6, where, to avoid repetition, individuals in the previous list are not included. 
104 The eight anti-Peronists were Camilo Almarza, Angel Basteri, Jose Domenech, Julio Duro 
Ameghino, Marcelino Ganza, Antonio Melani, Luis M. Rodriguez and Roberto Testa; the Peronists, 
Juan Carugo, Luis Cerutti, Luis Gonzalez, Ceferino Lopez, Telmo Luna, Juan Olivera, Placido Polo 
and Florencio Soto; the doubtful ones, of the Antonio Tramonti group, are, apart from himself, 
Santiago Domingo Diz and Bernardo Zugasti. 
105 LV 4 Sept. 1934; LV 31 Aug. 1935; LV 21 June 1936; LV 21 June 1936; CGTI 30 July 1937; CGT 
14 April 1939 and 12 April 1940; CGT 16 Sept. 1944; Democracia 20 Sept. 1946. I have only data up 
to 1940, which will be completed in a final version of this ongoing research. 
Name Ideology prior to 1943 Involvement in I 
Peronism I 
T a b l e 6 . Vocales i n t h e C o m i s i o n A d m i n i s t r a t i v a o f t h e U n i o n 
F e r r o v i a r i a ( 1 9 3 4 - 1 9 4 0 ) W h o D i d N o t H a v e P o s i t i o n s i n t h e M e s a 
D i r e c t i v a d u r i n g t h a t P e r i o d 1 0 6 
1 Andrino, Simeon Socialist p 
I Basteri, Angel Radical (UCR) no 
1 Caamano r Manuel Socialist no 
Campos, Antonio ? no 
Canon Martinez, Lorenzo Syndicalist p 
Cardoso, Pedro Syndicalist p 
f Dediomg^ Jose Socialist p 
I Delucci. Oscar 1 . ? p 
] Diaz. Mauncio p no 
| FiorevMario Socialist? p 
1 Maggio, Manuel Socialist p 
! Novo, Antemio or Alfredo Not Socialist p 
J Otegui, Francisco Not Socialist p 
1 Papajas, Jorge _ Communist no? 
| Pontien, Silvio _ Socialist _ 
i Posse, Francisco p p 
| Ratti, Alfredo Socialist yes? 
I Rivero, Donato Socialist p 
! Rondina^ Romul Syndicalist p 
i Ruybal, Manuel ? p 
1 Sanchez. Antonio Socialist ? j • "" 
| Scarano. Bartolome ? ? 
\ Solito, Nicolas Socialist p 
1 Stefanelh. Pedro p p 
I Taccone. Antonio p si 
Total vocales, not members of Mesas Directivas, Union Ferroviaria 1934—40 25 
Clearly anti-Peronist 4 (16%) 
Possibly anti-Peronist 1 (4%) 
Clearly Peronist 2 (8%) 
Possibly Peronist 1 (4%) 
No information 17 (68%) 
At this level, the in fo rma t ion I have is no t sufficient, b u t w h a t little there is shows an 
equi l ibr ium, even if, as a rgued earlier, the re is m o r e likely to be a lack of in format ion 
o n those w h o were displaced f r o m thei r posit ions by newcomers . Th i s fact c an also be 
ascer ta ined by m a k i n g a c o m p l e m e n t a r y analysis, as fo r the C G T ; tha t is, listing all 
m e m b e r s of the clearly Peronis t Comis ion Adminis t ra t iva of the U n i o n Ferroviar ia in 
1946, inc luding b o t h the M e s a Direct iva a n d the vocales, to identify their par t ic ipat ion 
in similar roles be tween 1934 a n d 1940. 
106 Same sources as for table 5. 
Table 7. The Comis ion Administrativa (CA) of the Union Ferroviaria in 
1946: Previous Record of its Members1 0 7 
Arrieta, Victor ? vocal none 
Girola, Luis Socialist Treasurer Assistant Treasurer 
Gomez, Luis ? vocal none 
Gonzalez, Luis ! Socialist vocal Treasurer 
Granato, Angel ? vocal none 
Gutierrez, Eduardo Socialist? Second Vice President none 
Luna, Telmo Socialist President Vice President 
Pautasso, Bartolome p vocal none 
Peixotto, Pedro p vocal none 
Pimenta, Joaquin p Assistant Treasurer none 
Pontieri, Felix p vocal none 
Rodriguez,Juan Socialist First Vice President none 
Rosendo, Ignacio ! Socialist vocal none 
Taccone, Antonio 1 ? vocal vocal 
Vazquez, Alej I ? vocal none 
Verde, Francisco | ? \ Secretario de Actas none 
As can be seen, the group is mostly new. However, there is what may be called a 
'sub-elite' of the old leadership cadre, Luis Gonzalez, Luis Girola and Telmo Luna, 
all of whom had been members of the Socialist Party, but obviously at odds, during 
the process of consolidation of Peronism, with the more senior group of the socialists 
Domenech and Almarza, and the syndicalist Luis Maria Rodriguez, who, as most 
members of his ideological current, had also antagonised Domenech in the past but 
now coincided with him in opposition to the new mass movement. 
An event usually considered very important as an indicator of the labour move-
ment's transition to Peronism is the meeting of the Comite Central Confederal 
(CCC) of the CGT on 16 October 1945, where a majority decided to declare a gen-
eral strike for 18 October. As is well known, the popular mobilisation in fact was al-
ready taking place, fired by other people, like Cipriano Reyes, outside that room 
where the supposed representatives of the CGT were considering their strategy. In 
that meeting the representatives of the Union Ferroviaria were very reticent to de-
clare the strike, which they believed might be a leap into the void, given the apparent 
strength of the transitory military regime led by General Eduardo Avalos and Admiral 
Hector Vernengo Lima, who had overthrown and jailed Peron. The strike was finally 
declared, but for the 18th, while the massive gathering of the 17th was the result of a 
different type of mass phenomenon. It is true that trade unionism, in its pro-Peron 
sector, provided some intermediate structures, as has been suggested by the revisionist 
school. But the machine stood on different foundations. 
Anyway, it is necessary to enquire what those members of the CCC represented? 
In fact, they reflected a dismantled CGT, of which practically the only organisation 
of any weight present was the Union Ferroviaria, plus its closely associated Union 
107 Same sources as for tables 5 and 6. 
Tranviarios Automotor, and the rather artificial Asociacion de Empleados del 
Estado, as shown in Table 8. 
Table 8. Members of die CCC of die CGT in die Meeting of 16 October 1945 108 
108 Sources: 'Acta de la reunion del CCC de la CGT del 16 de octubre de 1945,' Pasadoy Presente, New 
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109 The CSIG, Comision Socialista de Information Gremial, was a watchdog group seeking to 
establish discipline among labour members of the Socialist Party. 
1.0 He was in the CGT before the expulsion of Luis Gay, not in the following one. Most probably he 
was a rebel along with Gay. 
1.1 He accused Andreotti, as earlier the communists, of being inexpert and a divisionist. He was in the 
CGT in 1948, and was an interventor in the telephone union for a short time. 
Let us now examine in more detail what was happening in the unions active in the 
various occupational fields, whether within or outside the CGT, to see the involve-
ment of the real labour leadership of the time in the CGT and its Comite Central 
Confederal (CCC). 
1. The skilled artisan unions 
The more skilled unions, of an artisan type, working usually in small or medium-scale 
enterprises, were the printers, the shoemakers, the woodworkers (including furniture 
makers), the painters and the plumbers. Also within this group one might include the 
tailors and seamstresses, a very divided and heterogeneous union, with a large female 
contingent and a very ideological and activist minority. 
The printers had a long tradition of autonomous organisation, with recurrent di-
visions along speciality or ideological lines. Often the union was not a part of the 
central confederations, so as to avoid divisions. Or, when these were inevitable, there 
usually was one group linked to the CGT and a smaller one, of syndicalist 
orientation, to the USA. In the former there was a socialist majority, oscillating be-
tween loyalty to the party and a more independent leftist attitude, plus some anar-
chist and communist minorities. Renee Stordeur, Riego Ribas and Luis Danussi were 
its main figures, while in the syndicalist sector Sebastian Marotta was the towering 
personality. None of them joined Peronism, neither did almost any of the established 
leaders at an intermediate level. This union was not represented in the CCC of 
October 1945. 
The shoemakers had as their main leader the socialist Alfredo Fidanza, who re-
mained a dedicated opponent of the new regime. His union could not be controlled 
by the government, which was forced to create an alternative organisation, with 
mostly new people plus a couple of members of the old cadre, such as Juan J . 
Casimiro and Silvio Catalano, who had been prosecretario and secretario de actas at some 
point, though they had ceased to be members of the board in 1939. No representa-
tive of either the old or the new union was present at the CCC. 
The woodworkers had started as a federation of many highly specialised trades 
(iebanistas, doradores, etc.) and later expanded to incorporate more industrially-oriented 
furniture making and the rougher carpenters. Some of the latter, however, had been 
incorporated into the Building Trades Federation, run by the communists, with 
whom there were often demarcation disputes. The woodworkers had a complex his-
tory of divisions and fusions, impossible to follow here. One of their main early 
leaders was Alejandro Silvetti, a syndicalist with a very radical past who later had to 
adopt a more moderate strategy. After losing in 1935 his position in the CGT 
Secretariat (due to the internal 'coup' of December 1935 engineered by socialists and 
communists), he got a job as carpenter at an official agency. It is not impossible that 
he may have obtained it through the connections he had established with the then 
governing groups, but the fact is that he returned to the shop floor, and being now a 
public employee, he affiliated to the Asociacion de Trabajadores del Estado (ATE), 
where he found others in a similar situation, like Andres Cabona, who had started as 
a mimbrero (willow furniture maker). Both of them retained a strongly oppositional 
attitude in their new union. 
To return to the woodworkers, Silvetti's role there was taken up by the independ-
ent leftist Mateo Fossa and the communists Luis V. Sommi and Vicente Marischi, 
also anti-Peronists. There was, however, one sector of the old cadres who joined the 
new mass movement. Among them was Eduardo Seijo, a Chilean, who was the only 
member of the previous group who appeared in the Comision Directiva of die new 
union organised from official spheres, but after a couple of years he fell from favour 
and was deported to his own country, because of his solidary stance towards Luis 
Gay. The other relevant leader to join the new authorities was Carlos Luis Salas, 
syndicalist of a distinguished career in the Union Sindical Argentina (USA), almost 
equivalent to that of Luis Gay, but he did not accede to the governing body of the 
new union. Of all these, the only one who was present in the CCC of October 1945 
was Eduardo Seijo. 
The painters were a complicated trade, where there was a great deal of anarchist 
influence, headed by Antonio Cabrera, who evolved towards syndicalism. He was a 
great critic of the communist control of the Federacion Obrera Nacional de la 
Construction (FONC), which had a Painters' Branch. Towards the beginning of 
1946, Cabrera joined the Federation, in a move to confront the Peronist common 
enemy. Among the plumbers there was even greater anarchist influence, with leaders 
such as Alberto Balbuena and Carlos Cristoff, also opposed to the Communist 
FONC, which also had a branch of that speciality, but with little impact. Neither 
painters nor plumbers were present at the CCC meeting, because they did not belong 
to the CGT, but were either autonomous or linked to the USA. 
The tailors and seamstresses were very much divided between socialists and 
communists. Their competition could lead us to predict the collaboration of the 
former with the authorities. This in fact happened, with this faction including 
Cipriano Barreiro, of a very controversial trajectory, and others like Jose Ramon 
Mendez (who died in 1946) and Antonio Valerga, all of whom became leaders of a 
new organisation, the Federacion Obrera Nacional de la Industria del Vestido 
(FONIVA), where Jose Alonso, a new militant, started his career. The communist 
sector, headed by Julio Liberman, Mauricio Ribak and Mauricio Schuster, was 
severely persecuted and cast aside. 
2. Land transport 
In the area of land transport the Union Ferroviaria had an undisputed pre-eminence, 
flanked by the more skilled locomotive drivers of La Fraternidad and by the Union 
Tranviarios Automotor, which had been created largely through the initiative and 
support of the railwaymen and was equally dominated by the socialists. 
Of these unions, La Fraternidad remained practically untouched by the Peronist 
wave, and had disaffiliated from the CGT in protest against its political involvement. 
The very determined attitude of the Fraternidad has been often dismissed by re-
searchers as reflecting a typical 'middle class' reaction. This is not really so, though it 
is not very useful to argue where the middle class starts or ends. The fact is that it was 
an occupational group with a long tradition of solid organisation, along reformist and 
moderate lines, but in close daily interaction with the Union Ferroviaria members in 
their work environment. The role of both unions in the anti-government strikes of 
1951 is well known. 
As for the Union Ferroviaria, it certainly had a big presence in the CCC meeting, 
with a group of delegates in which some seasoned militants were mixed with new 
ones, but several dominant figures had been cut out. Political pragmatism was very 
widespread in that union, as well as a preference for acting direcdy in the national 
arena, not through the intermediation of a political party. Domenech shared this 
commitment, a source of constant friction with the Socialist Party, of which he was 
most of the time a member. 
Of the twelve railway delegates at the CCC, five had little weight, being rather 
new in these matters.112 Three others had been active at a local level, Bartolome 
Pautasso in Santa Fe, Antonio Parrilli in Junin and Anselmo Malvicini in Liniers. 
The latter would later acquire much prominence, as an interventor in various unions 
that had nothing to do with his own trade, like the metal and the phone workers, and 
in that sense he was a forerunner of a type of leader who was to become increasingly 
common. The other four, Ramon Tejada of San Juan, Demetrio Figueras of Santa 
Fe, Juan Jose Perazzolo of Cruz del Eje and Silverio Pontieri of La Plata, merit spe-
cial consideration. Tejada was a guiding spirit in San Juan, a rather peripheral 
province. Figueras had been a prominent member of the Comite Socialists de 
Information Gremial (CSIG) and became a senator for Santa Fe. Perazzolo, an im-
portant ally of Domenech, was very much opposed in the CCC meeting to declaring 
the strike, deriding the attitudes of 'jovenes inexpertos' like metalworker Antonio 
Andreotti, who were now assuming the divisionist and irresponsible role earlier per-
formed by the communists. Pontieri, a man with a long career, of syndicalist origins but 
close to the Socialist Party, combined an opposition to the strike with a determination 
to join Peronism from positions of autonomy, as can be seen in his memoirs.113 In this 
book, published in 1972, he repeatedly quotes Juan B. Justo (not a very fashionable 
thing at the time), and while disagreeing with his position towards the gold standard, he 
points out 'the respect and admiration we workers always had for DrJ.B. Justo, due to 
his nobility and his extraordinary capacity'.114 Soon Pontieri, a member of the Lower 
House of Congress, clashed with officialdom, even though he persisted in his support 
for the regime, and spent 25 months in prison after 1955. But in his recollections he 
avers that the CGT had degenerated, becoming a feared oligarchy, 'so divorced from 
our feelings that its name, traditionally so much loved and respected, now antagonised 
the workers themselves; it became increasingly common, including in this city of La 
Plata, for members to find it difficult to select their representatives'.115 On the other 
hand, his opposition to mobilisationism shows in his opinion that 'the revolution of 
October 17' was due to the strike convoked by the CGT, and not to the mass concen-
tration of that day in the Plaza de Mayo.116 Along the same lines, he condemns 
politicians, 'eternos embaucadores', and persists in claiming that the working class 
organisations must remain aloof from party political involvement, but favour industri-
alisation and the nationalisation of public services.117 Together with fellow diputado 
112 Florencio Blanco, Julio Cap rara, Jose GrifFo, Jose Lebonatto and Jose Manso. 
1.3 Silverio Pontieri, La Confederacidn General del Trabajo. La revolucidn del 17 de octubre de 1945,y otros trabajos 
(Buenos Aires, 1972). 
1.4 Ibid., p. 174. 
1.5 Ibid., p. 131. 
1.6 Ibid., pp. 131-3. 
1.7 CGT, 16 May 1945. 
Angel Ponce he proposed a law that would have required all state enterprises to have 
worker representatives on the boards.118 In other words, a good representative of the 
'old guard', prepared to cooperate autonomously with Peronism. But there were not 
many like him. 
The Union Tranviarios Automotor was also strongly represented at the CGC, 
through its secretary general, Nestor Alvarez, new to his job (he had been there since 
1944), accompanied by four newer or less influential colleagues.119 Most of those who 
had held positions as presidents, vice-presidents, or general secretaries of the union 
between 1936 and 1946, like Victorino Fernandez ('lackey of Domenech'), Manuel 
Barreiro, Jose Guarna (communist), Valentin Rubio, Ramon Seijas and Isaac Perez, 
were not to be found in the Comision Directiva of 1946. Of them only Rubio had a 
clear involvement with Peronism, together with the newer and already mentioned 
Nestor Alvarez. The latter, however, insisted in the CGC meeting that the strike 
should be declared to defend the social benefits acquired, and not to obtain the lib-
eration of Peron, as that meant hitching the movement to a person. To sum up, the 
UTA was a union which, like the UF, tried to negotiate with the new authorities, but 
a great many of its longstanding cadres remained aloof. In the Comision Directiva of 
1946 the president, Manuel Bernardez, and the vice-president, Emilio Bagnola, were 
devoid of a curriculum, while the general secretary, Isaias Santin, was a Spaniard 
who had been in the Guardia Civil during the civil war, 'despite which he was a good 
person' according to the Peronist municipal worker, Pedro Otero. 
3. The riverine circuit 
Three major unions were active in what might be referred to as the riverine circuit: 
The Federacion Obrera Maritima (FOM), the port workers (often divided) and the 
ship repairers (Federacion Obrera de la Construccion Naval), none of them repre-
sented in the CCC of the CGT because they were autonomous or affiliated to the 
Union Sindical Argentina (USA). In this area there was a strong syndicalist and anar-
chist influence, and there were long-running conflicts between these two tendencies, 
and between them and the so-called 'free' or 'yellow' groups. In the ports the entre-
preneurs and the police were very worried about stoppages, particularly virulent in 
times of harvest (as had happened first in 1902), and thus made strenuous efforts to 
cultivate friendly and submissive organisations. 
The Maritime Workers (FOM) were the backbone of the syndicalist current, 
performing for it a role similar to the Union Ferroviaria (UF) for the socialists. l ife on 
board ship, and the port environment, created a sort of 'occupational community' 
based on an intense interaction between members, and a close physical propinquity 
between work and home.120 On the other hand, the easy access, via the river net-
work, to many far-away localities, allowed them to organise stevedores and 'oficios 
118 CGT, 1 Sept. 1946. 
1,9 Bruno Arpesella, defined as a 'shopworker'; Dorindo Carballido and Felipe Nazca, new militants; 
and Ramiro Lombardia, with a scanty record, but who would later be, among other things, intewentor in 
the new building trades union, the Union Obrera de la Construccion de la Republica Argentina 
(UOCRA), which, despite being a creation of Peronism, immediately had internal problems requiring 
external arbitrage. 
120 An early study of this kind of environment is T.S. Simey et al., The Dock Worker (Liverpool, 1954). 
varios' in small trade and transport centres along the river routes, where otherwise 
union activity would have been unknown. There was also contact with forestry 
workers, especially those in the tannin-producing regions of northern Santa Fe and 
Ghaco. The province of Entre Rios particularly was reached in this way, and its 
Provincial Federation was a stronghold of syndicalism. 
The activists of the FOM (affiliated to the USA) in their great majority remained 
aloof from the new mass movement. Their main leader during the period under con-
sideration was Fortunato Marinelli, who did participate, like so many others, in 
conversations and advice when asked by the new authorities, but remained 
independent (he died in September 1945). Others in a similar position were Antonio 
Aguilar (his successor at the helm of the FOM), Pedro Rufino Velazquez, Juan 
Aparicio, Juan Bronzini, Humberto Cavigliani and Manuel Pardo. In this occupa-
tional area there was an originally much smaller group, inspired by the Socialist 
Party, which had been trying without much success to install a rival organisation, 
finally created in 1943, the Union Obrera Maritima (UOM). Some of its leaders, like 
Cosme Givoge and Manuel Pichel, joined the Peronist bandwagon, but it proved 
impossible to overcome, from the inside, the resistance of the FOM. Finally, faced 
with unremitting official pressure, the FOM agreed, in 1947, to form a confederation 
with the UOM, in a process which finally produced the Sindicato de Obreros 
Maritimos Unidos (SOMU), within which there was an uneasy coexistence of both 
currents. This unitary attitude, under the banner of political non-involvement, 
brought the leaders of the FOM the condemnation by the more intransigent enemies 
of the regime, but for them it was obviously a strategy of institutional survival, and 
they cannot be considered as having been incorporated into the Peronist cause.121 
A much smaller, and highly artisan union, was that of the ship builders (actually, 
repairers). They had an intensely federal structure, with branches, or autonomous 
affiliated unions, of painters, boilermarkers, riverside carpenters, caulkers and other 
similar trades, clearly anarchist in its cadres, though, to avoid divisions, it remained 
autonomous and did not affiliate to the libertarian Federacion Obrera Regional 
Argentina (FORA). Among its main representatives were Rodolfo Almeida, Angel 
Borda, Angel Brussoni, Juan Balbi, Atilio Biondi, Humberto Correale and Jorge 
Gatuzzin. They remained fiercely independent, with strong support in their neigh-
bourhood networks, even if the pressure of circumstances forced them in 1952 to set 
aside some of their principles and appeal to the 'Excelentisimo Senor Presidente de la 
Republica (it was no longer a 'Region') Argentina', asking him to intervene with the 
police commissar who had closed their headquarters.122 
In the port sector, also not represented at the CCC, the situation was too chaotic 
to describe here in any detail. There was a fairly widespread anarchist influence, with 
leaders who moved in and out of this occupation (like Humberto Correale and Angel 
Borda). One of the few with a previous record of activity who joined Peronism was 
Jeronimo Schizzi, who, however, was soon replaced by a wave of newcomers. 
121 In the periodical they jointly published, Congremar, one can find respectful references to national 
authorities, but no adulation as in many other publications of the time. 
122 The letter was signed by the general secretary Cesar Pagliarini, and the members of his board, 
Antonio Gonzalez, Atilio Biondi and Juan Balbi (El Obrero Calderero, Jan. 1952), none of whom had 
anything to do with Peronism. 
4. Manufacturing industry: textile, metallurgy, glass and paper 
The textile industry was expanding very rapidly during the Second World War. In 
1934 the two pre-existing unions had merged into the Union Obrera Textil (UOT), 
where there was an uneasy coexistence between socialists and communists until 1941, 
when they split. The leadership of both groups remained almost entirely detached 
from Peronism, as much the socialists Candido Gregorio, Juan Armendares, Lucio 
and Jorge Bonilla, Basilio and Demetrio Dimopulos, and Juan Pardo, as the commu-
nists Jorge Michellon, Gelindo Pellichero, Dora Genkin, Ida Pecheny, Flora Absatz, 
Meyer Kot and Heriberto Martinez. The only one of any note who apparendy joined 
the new movement was Prospero Malvestiti, of the PC, the subject of an incident in 
1943 when he was expelled for an early case of sexual harassment, or so they said. 
The government was forced to organise a rival union, the Asociacion Obrera Textil 
(AOT), set up by Mariano Tedesco and some of his friends, all of whom were very 
young and green. Nobody from the old cadres (not even Malvestiti) joined them, 
even though the communists, given the mass exodus of their rank and file, decided to 
join the AOT to bore from within. There was no representative of the textile workers 
at the CCC, because the U O T had withdrawn in protest at its political involvement. 
As for metallurgical workers, they had the Sindicato Obrero de la Industria 
Metalurgica (SOIM), under solid communist control, though there were some socialist 
militants, generally keeping a low profile. One of them, the rather obscure Angel 
Santiago Perelman, in 1943, before the military coup, formed the Union Obrera 
Metalurgica (UOM), with help from Domenech and his CGT no. 1, intent on offering 
an alternative to the communist organisation (affiliated to the CGT no. 2). There were 
very few people with a previous record present in the UOM, one of them being Alfredo 
Muzzopappa (he was later an interventor in the Municipal Union). The later more 
prominent Hilario Salvo was a new man. Among the old communist cadre were 
Marcos Maguidovich, general secretary for several years, who later on became a small-
scale entrepreneur; Muzio Girardi, his successor in 1942; A. Turiansky, deported in 
1936; J . Kaminetzky; and Juan Pavignano, all of them firm in their beliefs. In the CCC 
meeting of October 1945 there was only one representative of the newly formed UOM, 
Antonio Andreotti, without much of a previous trajectory. 
At the CCC meeting there was one representative from the glass workers, Nicolas 
D'Alessio, a new militant of that small union, where there was an important commu-
nist and anarchist presence. 
The paper workers were another expanding union, with a communist leadership, 
also not represented at the CCC. It was very active, along with the printers, the 
restaurant workers, the building trades, a sector of the woodworkers and the 
syndicalist USA, in attempting to counteract Peron's influence in the labour 
movement, the Comision de Unidad del Movimiento Obrero Argentina, set up in 
December 1945. 
5. Building andfood-workers: the bases of communist expansion 
The building (mosdy masons) and foodworkers (especially packers) occupational areas 
were typical venues for recent rural migrants. Communist influence was rapidly ex-
panding, with charismatic figures like Guido Fioravanti (deported in 1936, and 
replaced by Pedro Ghiarante) and Jose Peter. Among the meat workers there was a 
high concentration in run down neighbourhoods in Avellaneda and Berisso (near La 
Plata), quite apart from other enclaves in Zarate and further north, from Rosario to 
the province of Entre Rios. Among masons, their sporadic concentration in building 
sites also created a very special situation. One might wonder whether in these two 
areas a mobilisational and charismatic role could have been performed by the 
Communist Party. This might have been an alternative to Peronism, and something 
like that may have happened in Chile, where the Left had no difficulty in absorbing 
rural newcomers, though admittedly they were less numerous. In Argentina, in order 
to integrate the masses of recently mobilised workers, there was a need for a leader-
ship drawn from higher up the social pyramid than the communists could afford. It 
should also be pointed out that in Argentina there was a greater cultural difference 
between the organised sector of the proletariat and the unorganised, whether rural 
migrants or otherwise, who were only then waking up from a long slumber, under the 
strong impact of an anti status quo appeal from the state. 
In the building trades there was the increasingly strong Federacion Obrera 
Nacional de la Construccion (FONC), dominated by the communists, competing 
with some syndicalists and anarchists, the latter concentrated in the more skilled sec-
tors (painters, plumbers and carpenters). Among its leaders, apart from Fioravanti 
and Chiarante, there were Angel Molessini, Antonio Pettorella, Luis Fiori, Pedro 
Tadioli and Rubens Iscaro, none of whom became Peronist. The new rival organisa-
tion, backed from official spheres, the Union Obrera de la Construccion de la 
Republica Argentina (UOCRA), did not boast among its higher echelons virtually 
anyone with a relevant previous record. At the CCC meeting this erstwhile very im-
portant member of the CGT had no representation. 
As for meat workers, apart from Jose Peter and his comrade Jeronimo Arnedo 
Alvarez, there was a significant anarchist group operating in Avellaneda, with leaders 
like Lucas Dominguez, of the Anglo packing house, who occasionally was allied with 
Cipriano Reyes, and remained in opposition to the regime, even though he was not 
averse to occasional negotiations. Cipriano Reyes, who had a very diverse itinerant 
political and artistic trajectory in Buenos Aires province (his parents were circus 
performers), his union experience was rather brief and not very profound. He was an 
uncompromising enemy of the communists, and in this endeavour he often coincided 
with the anarchists. He got into trouble and ended up in prison, but Peron went there 
to pick him up and incorporate him into his legions, together with other less courageous 
persons, such as the socialist state employee's Jose Vicente Tesorieri, a rather strange 
way of forging an alliance. 
In Zarate there was a solid group of syndicalist activists, who did become involved 
in the Peronist movement, though their support was inconstant. Thus, Juan Beroch, 
socialist sympathiser (a fact not incompatible with syndicalist attitudes) entered the 
Partido Laborista, but he later abandoned it and ended up among the so-called Treinta 
y Dos Gremios Democraticos, the staunchly anti-Peronist post-1958 group. Another 
who also joined the movement, but was later a rebel, was Laureano Correa, while 
Clodomiro Caffaro, also from Zarate, remained loyal to it. Anyway, none of these were 
present at the CCC, partly because Reyes and his people were autonomous from the 
CGT, and Peter's followers had withdrawn from it. The only meat worker present was 
Ramon Bustamante, from Rosario, a man without much of a record. 
Another strategic food production sector was sugar. It had a long history of union 
organisation, from the early part of the century, but with little associationist intensity 
and a record of failures. Before the 1943 military coup there was a Union General de 
Trabajadores de la Industria Azucarera (UGTIA), which was reorganised in 1944, 
presided over by Juan M. Galvan, flanked by his vice-president, Ernesto Luna, and 
secretary general, Rosario Carrizo. In November of that same year Carlos Aguilar, 
an official from the Catholic Right, also interventor in the University of Tucuman, sup-
ported by people from the Secretaria de Trabajo y Prevision, organised a new 
structure, the Federacion Obrera Tucumana de la Industria Azucarera (FOTIA), 
recruiting local activists. Of the previous cadres of the UGTIA only vice-president 
Ernesto Luna survived, while the new general secretary was Celestino Valdez, a new 
militant. Soon afterwards the top role was taken over by Benito Boija Celiz, who was a 
member of the CCC of the CGT in October 1945, though he was not present at the 
meeting, probably because he was active in Tucuman. Another important Peronist 
leader was Manuel Lema, also at one time secretary general of the FOTIA and candi-
date for his province's governorship in 1947. Among the Left, there was a Trotskyite 
faction, inspired by Esteban Rey, who favoured 'boring from within' in the Socialist 
Party, and then joined its break-away Partido Socialists de la Revolution Nacional in 
1953, to follow the same strategy in the larger popular movement.123 
In the sugar industry probably the same thing happened as in other areas where 
union activity was very difficult, because of employer and police repression, as well as 
worker apathy: the few militants who could survive the pressures were highly self-
selected, with deep ideological or political motivations, who thus in their majority did 
not join the new movement, which by contrast was very attractive to those who had 
kept to themselves until the day before. In occupations like the railways, to give an ex-
treme example, where persecution was not widespread if it existed at all, leaders were 
nearer to the pragmatic and somewhat opportunistic mentality of the average worker. 
Also in the field of food, or rather drink, were the brewers, not very numerous but 
based in large workplaces in urban centres, which helped association. Two of their 
main leaders, Alcides Montiel and Jorge Negrelli, joined Peronism, the latter being 
present at the CCC meeting, while a newer militant, Juan C. Rodriguez, also a 
member, was absent. Montiel, described in an interview (by Aurelio Hernandez, for 
El Nacional) as a 'trabajador criollo', with a long record, was fairlyactive in the organi-
sation of the 17 October mobilisation. 
Finally, in this area it is necessary to mention the ancient trade of the bakers, with 
a great anarchist influence, and where divisions and factional fights were endemic. Its 
traditional cadres, Dante Ariola, Feliciano Gascon, Jose Castello, Clodomiro 
Chavaria, Ricardo Lopez (general secretaries at one time or another between 1936 
and 1943) remained aloof from Peronism. The same could be said of Salvador 
Dell'Aquila (communist) and Angel Gonzalez (socialist). When the Secretaria de 
123 Daniel Santamaria (ed.), Las huelgas azucareras de Tucumdn: 1923 (Buenos Aires, 1984); Maria Gelia 
Bravo, 'Liberates, socialistas, Iglesia y patrones frente a la situacion de los trabajadores en Tucuman,' in 
Juan Suriano (ed.), La cuestidn social en Argentina, 1870-1943 (Buenos Aires, 2000), pp. 31-61; Ernesto 
Gonzalez (coord.), Eltrotskismo obrero e intemacionalista en la Argentina, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1995, 1996). 
Trabajo y Prevision sponsored the formation of a new union, it had to rely on people 
like Pedro Conde (later labour attache in the USSR) and Jose Costoya, who had 
never risen to prominence among the bakers. Given its tradition of autonomy, the 
union was not a member of the GGT and thus had no representatives there. 
An interesting case among the bakers is that of Laureano Riera Diaz, a fiery 
anarchist who had published in 1941 a fortnightly paper, Solidaridad. In 1947 he too 
was involved in 'entrismo',124 joining the new official bakers' union as secretario de 
actas, and participated in declarations favourable to the Five Year Plan. This earned 
him expulsion from the Federacion Anarco Gomunista Argentina (FACA), of which 
he had obviously been a member up to that time. But this did not help, because he 
was branded, and he finally had to exile himself to Montevideo for the duration.125 
6. The unions of the political world: state and commerce 
The state employees' unions (at a national and at the municipal level, i.e. the 
Asociacion de Trabajadores del Estado [ATE] and the Union de Obreros 
Municipales [UOM] of Buenos Aires and its national Confederation) were highly 
dependent on the political world. So too were the commerce employees, where mili-
tancy was low but visibility in downtown areas high, and it was necessary to cultivate 
friends in Congress in order to get legislative support 
Among national state employees (ATE) there was a confrontation between 
syndicalists, hegemonic in their main branch office, in Buenos Aires, and the 
socialists, capable of obtaining a majority in national congresses, on the basis of 
numerous, rather small local branches over-represented due to federalist considera-
tions. Jose Vicente Tesorieri and Delfin Tato were the main cadres linked to the 
socialists. The former was recruited by Peron after spending five months in prison, 
and got a job at the Secretaria de Trabajo y Prevision. Another leader who played a 
significant role in the transition to Peronism was Aniceto Alpuy, a syndicalist from 
Entre Rios and friend of Luis Gay. In 1946 he was a member of the governing board 
of a reconstituted ATE, but he was soon shunted aside due to his solidarity with his 
disgraced friend. Something similar happened to Mario Di Pancrazio. Firmer in their 
newly acquired convictions were Manuel Beceiro and Miguel Altrudi, and more so 
Cecilio Conditti, devoid of a previous record, but with a very full one later as 
intewentor in the textile and the printers' unions. Another member of the early Peronist 
group was Libertario Ferrari, a sympathiser of the Radical Party nationalist group 
FORJA, who died in 1947 in a plane accident. 
The main syndicalist faction in the old ATE, in contrast to the above, remained 
staunchly anti-Peronist, including Andres Cabona, Alejandro Silvetti, Juan Cuomo, 
and the independent leftists or communists Jose Rodriguez Semino and Federico 
Duvanced. On the board of the new official ATE (renamed Asociacion de Obreros y 
Empleados del Estado) in 1948 only new militants were present, including Jose De 
Rosa, Hector Hugo Di Pietro and Juan Durso. At the CCC meeting of the CGT in 
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October 1945 Alpuy and Ferrari were present, and Tesorieri was also a member, but 
he was absent. 
Among municipal workers (mosdy manual, including garbage collectors and re-
pair shop personnel) the main representative organisation was the Union de Obreros 
Municipales (UOM) of Buenos Aires city, with the towering leadership of Francisco 
Perez Leiros, a very important figure in the Socialist Party, who had long been a 
member of the Lower House. He and his close collaborators Juan Brennan and 
Pedro Perez Villar remained opposed to Peronism, as did the main cadres of other, 
rival unions, like the independent leftists or syndicalists Alejandro Villanustre, 
Beniamino Semiza, Jose Ritta Luz, and Jose Penelon. However, within the U O M 
there was a rival socialist group, in opposition to Perez Leiros, who joined the 
Peronist movement, formed by Juan B. Ugazio, Nicolas Campos, Juan Cresta, Pedro 
Contardo and Jose Marotta, apart from the younger Pedro Otero. This is an impor-
tant faction of old leaders, but Perez Leiros had a solid control of his union (after 
1955 he returned to its helm for ten years or so), and therefore the UOM was inter-
vened, as it could not be subverted from inside despite the presence of the above-
mentioned dissident group. In the CCC of October 1945 Ugazio, Campos and 
Cresta were members, appointed by the union's intervener, and either because of this 
or because of their doubts they were absent from the meeting. So was Alejandro 
Protti, a strange cadre with a long trajectory, a member of the syndicalist union oper-
ating in the field, but who was expelled by it in 1936, and then joined 'La Portena', a 
not highly appreciated organisation known for co-operating with the authorities, 
whoever they might have been. Due to Perez Leiros's continued influence, the 
intervention remained in place for several years. 
As for the commerce employees, their main structure was the so-called 
'Federacion' de Empleados de Comercio (born as a merger of several specialised 
unions of the city of Buenos Aires, thus its name), which had organised at national 
level a Confederation de Empleados de Comercio, with important groups in some 
cities of the rest of the country. The leadership in Buenos Aires was closely linked to 
the Socialist Party, with people like Angel Borlenghi, Jose M. Argana and Vicente De 
Cesare, and allies in other cities, among the most prominent David Diskin, of Bahra 
Blanca, and Juan Apullan, of Santa Fe, all of them incorporated into the new mass 
movement, though after much vacillation. Among those who remained in opposition 
were the communist Jose Royo, the socialist Luis Di Cesare, and the anarchist 
Victorino Rodriguez, undisputed chief of the Rosario branch, where the equally lib-
ertarian Jose Grunfeld was present. 
Clearly, in the capital the top union cadre was oriented towards collaboration 
with the government, even if among its mosdy middle class rank and file there must 
have been many supporters of the Union Democratica. At national level the 
Confederation retained an independent stance, and therefore did not send delegates 
to the CCC. 
7. Newly organised services: telecommunications, health, restaurants, porters 
The phone workers union, led by Luis Gay and his close associate Modesto Orozco, 
was under syndicalist dominance, and thus usually affiliated to the USA, or 
autonomous. Both Gay and Orozco had been dismissed from the phone company, 
and were retained by the union as paid officers. They were at odds with another 
group made up of Jose M. Cabrera, Rodolfo Fabiano and Raul Barros, more closely 
linked to the ideologically oriented syndicalists like Cabona, Silvetti or Sebastian 
Marotta. Socialist and communist groups added to this confusion, occasionally gen-
erating short-lived breakaway structures. Gay and Orozco, having being opposed up 
to mid-1944, finally joined Peronism and contributed to the formation of the Partido 
Laborista, but both later went into opposition, against Peron's attempt to take over the 
Partido Laborista, Gay's brainchild. Gay was simply expelled, while Orozco, a member 
of the Lower House, withdrew from the Peronist bloc. Of the rival group Fabiano and 
Barros adopted a clearly anti-Peronist position, while Cabrera was closer to the 
movement. In any case, none of these people were in the union's Comision Directiva in 
1948. Due to their autonomous orientation (they had disaffiliated from the anti-Peronist 
USA) they did not have representatives at the CCC. 
The health sector (mostly hospital employees and nurses) had been organised by 
Aurelio Hernandez, who had long since set aside his early communist beliefs, and 
was helped by Perez Leiros to set up a union in a field where there were demarcation 
problems. Hernandez, also a freelance journalist, joined the new movement together 
with his second in command Inocencio Di Giovanni, and became the head of the 
GGT after Luis Gay's defenestration, but he too was soon replaced by more malle-
able types. The union had no delegates at the CCC. 
Restaurant workers were quite numerous and expanding. They claimed to have 
100,000 members in 1942, or maybe they referred to the number of potentially or-
ganisable workers, though apathy was rampant. They were torn between classical 
syndicalists (with some anarchist elements) and the communists or other independent 
leftists. The main pre-1943 leaders, Maximo Suarez, Juan Vescovo and Angel Ojeda, 
were able to keep their union independent up to 1947, and had formed before the 1946 
elections a Comision de Unidad del Movimiento Obrero Argentino to resist the spread 
of Peronism. Later on, in the new union which was organised with official help, none of 
the above had any participation, and apparently the struggle was between Ramon 
Suarez (no kin to Maximo), considered a 'nazionalista' and a henchman of police chief 
Filomeno Velazco by La Vanguardia, and a certain Gariboto, who more pragmatically 
followed interior minister Angel Borlenghi. The union, not affiliated to the CGT, had 
no delegates at the CGC. 
The porters of apartment houses or condominiums were not highly organised, but 
were part of the GGT. Eligio Garcia, who had started his career in 1944, joined 
Peronism but was later a rebel, and towards the 1960s he was still fighting the leader-
ship and meriting the praise of the 'Treinta y Dos Gremios Democraticos'. In the 
October 1945 CCG the union was represented by another new militant, Pablo Larrosa. 
It is possible to interpret all this information in various ways, though it appears 
that the great majority of the established leadership — including all occupational 
sectors, and all ideologies — remained in opposition to the new regime. A new 
'verticalista' model was being created, based on the appeal of a leader and his 
entourage, using, admittedly, some of the old cadres as an amalgam. In other words, 
what was happening was the replacement of an autonomous working class organisa-
tion by an authoritarian and mobilisationist one. It was a great divide, clearly 
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